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After the closure of the ICTR in December 2016, 
the ICTY has now too closed its doors. The ruling 
in the Mladic case was highly anticipated by many 
people, but it was the dramatic suicide in court by 
the defendant Praljak after hearing his verdict 
which probably stands out in people’s memory. The 
ICTY would have deserved a better closure – after 
the tough start it managed to prosecute and convict 
a large group of defendants and has produced a lot 
of important case law – see for analysis of the 
legacy of the ICTY the contribution of Barbora 
Hola and Mirza Buljubasic. It is now time for the 
ICC to take over and continue this legacy. But the 
ICC is facing hard times as well and it has to be 
seen to what extent the withdrawal of Burundi will 
affect the court – as discussed by James Nyawo. 
Unfortunately there is still much left to do as Joris 
van Wijk shows in his contribution on Bangladesh 
and the Rohingya Refugees. National courts should 
take their responsibility as well. The Dutch district 
court in The Hague is one of the European courts 
which takes its task seriously as becomes clear from 
the contribution of Thijs Bouwknegt. Maartje 
Weerdesteijn discusses the change of power in 
Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe was forced out of 
the presidency after 37 years. 
 
In the research section, Pieter Nanninga discusses 
the challenges and benefits of his fascinating 
research in which he interviews Islamic State 
supporters online. Adina Nistor writes about the 
conference on punishing international crimes in 
domestic courts and Melanie O’Brien talks us 
through the bi-annual conference of the 
International Association of genocide Scholars 
(IAGS). There is a broad selection of new books, 
compiled by Suzanne Schot and myself and the 
recommended book is All Rise – by Tjitske 
Lingsma. Carola Lingaas summarizes her PhD on 
the concept of race in international criminal law, 
which she defended at Oslo University recently. 
There is a slight change in the editorial board as 
Roelof Haveman has stepped down as editor-in-
chief. We wish to thank Roelof for his work as 
editor-in-chief for the last few years and are glad he 





• 4-7 April 2018, International Studies 




• 12-14 June 2018: Stockholm Criminology 
Symposium, Stockholm, Sweden.  
Deadline: 28 February 2018  
http://www.criminologysymposium.com/ 
 
• 4-7 July 2018 INOGS International 
Conference, Marseille, France. Deadline: 15 
March 2018, https://inogs.com/conferences/  
 
• 29 August – 1 September 2018, European 
Society of Criminology (ESC) – annual 
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CRIMINOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
If you organize a conference, workshop or 
symposium related to international crimes, 
please inform us 
a.l.smeulers@rug.nl  
 and we will make a reference on our website 
and in the newsletter. 
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THE HAGUE NEWS  
 
Alternative Legacies? 'Images and Imageries' of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
By Barbora Hola and Mirza Buljubasic 
 
On 21 December 2017 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held its 
final closing ceremony in the beautiful and historic 
Hall of Knights in the Peace Palace in The Hague. 
The high-level event was attended by many 
officials, diplomatic corps and UN high 
representatives, including the UN Secretary General 
(SG) and the Dutch Royal Family. During the 
closing, the ICTY was celebrated as "a ground 
breaking moment", not only dispensing 
accountability to those responsible but also 
contributing to "the healing process" of victims, 
documenting "undeniable truth and facts of past 
tragedies" and leaving records, which will "ensure 
that the world will not forget, that history cannot be 
re-written [and] victims' voices will continue to 
resound down the decades."1 The final festivities 
constituted the peak in a series of "the legacy 
events" organized by the ICTY, and on its behalf, 
during 2017 to celebrate and emphasise, over and 
over again, achievements of this pioneering 
international criminal justice institution. Indeed, in 
2017 one can confidently state that the ICTY has 
proven wrong many sceptics, who back in 1993 
after its establishment considered the then 
struggling institution to soon fade away and be 
forgotten. Over the course of 24 years, the ICTY 
indicted 161 individuals for their involvement in 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed during the wars of Yugoslav secession. 
Ninety were convicted and nineteen acquitted. It 
held over 10.500 trial days and heard over 4600 
witnesses. It collected a significant amount of 
archival material. It sparked and assisted in war 
crimes prosecutions before domestic courts in the 
successor countries of the Former Yugoslavia. It 
indisputably contributed to the revival and 
consolidation of international criminal law and its 
doctrine. It also inspired a significant amount of 
interest in this field of law and contributed to the 
development of "the international criminal justice 
industry" with many NGOs, IGOs, lawyers and 
academics now fervently "fighting impunity" for 
                                                                
1 The UN Secretary-General's remarks at Closing 
Ceremony for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia [as delivered], 21 




those responsible of mass atrocity crimes 
committed around the globe. 
 
In the international diplomatic and political circles 
the ICTY is hailed for all these achievements and 
largely considered a success. Its legacies are, 
however, much more mixed and controversial when 
we zoom in on those 'spaces and places', where 
actual crimes were actually committed. There, 
where people were most affected by the crimes, be 
it victims, perpetrators, bystanders or those in 
between these categories, have been trying to come 
to terms with the violent past. In Bosnia, Croatia, 
Serbia and Kosovo, the images and imageries of the 
Tribunal are different from the international halo. 
The Tribunal's image as a success story is 
contested, politicized and largely divided along 
ethnic lines. For those closely following the ICTY 
developments this is certainly not surprising. Think 
only of the widely reported reactions to the final 
'drama' of the last ICTY judgment delivered in 
November 2017, less than one month before the 
December closing ceremony. During the reading of 
the verdict, one of the defendants, Croatian General 
Praljak, theatrically drank a cyanide poison in the 
courtroom in contestation of his conviction and the 
label of war criminal. The reactions shared on 
social media were swift, critical and largely divided 
along ethnic lines. The Croatian Prime Minister 
Andrej Plenkovic used Praljak’s suicide as 
confirming the “deep moral injustice” of the whole 
verdict, which, according to him, stands against 
"the historical truth", while many Bosniak victims’ 
representatives welcomed the verdict as "just" and  
"an end to a dark part of history.”2 
 
In this short exposé, we touch upon the ways in 
which media and political elites in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina3 have been 'colouring' the images of 
the ICTY in Bosnia (and beyond) and how these 
evolved over time. The media reporting seems to 
have evolved from the initial indifference towards 
the ICTY and scepticism towards its judicial 
capabilities, largely shared among all ethnic groups, 
to its increased relevance in public space. This 
relevance, however, was expressed by an increasing 
criticism of the Tribunal's activities, largely divided 
along ethnic lines, and seemingly 'schizophrenic' 
portrayals of the ICTY fluctuating over time, on an 
ad-hoc basis. The portrayals were framed around a 
'us versus them' logic depending on 'whose' 
defendant was at the moment being convicted 
and/or acquitted, and for what. 
                                                                
2 See Balkan Insight reporting available here 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-
rejects-party-of-bosnian-croats-verdict-11-29-2017  
3 Some of the media reporting referred to in this 
contribution also stems from Croatia and Serbia. 
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After its establishment in May 1993, when the war 
was still on-going and atrocities were being 
regularly committed, the ICTY Prosecutor's Office 
did not immediately have access to crime scenes in 
Bosnia. All sides to the conflict, Bosniaks, Serbs 
and Croats, were mainly indifferent to the new 
institution, primarily due to its initial struggles to 
establish itself and a lack of judicial action. In fact, 
the international community was perceived as a 
clear interference in internal affairs of (newly 
established) the Republics. Especially Bosniaks 
watched the first years of the ICTY with distrust, 
which was due to the arms embargo imposed by the 
international community.4 Serbs seemed to have 
also been largely unconcerned, though alert, to the 
new Tribunal.5 In 1995, Radovan Karadžić, the 
Bosnian Serb political leader during the war, 
famously stated "The Hague does not concern us 
[Serbs]!"6 After the Bosnian Serb Duško Tadić was 
arrested in Germany in 1994 and extradited to the 
ICTY in 1995, and after indictments were officially 
announced against 21 Serbs, the image of the ICTY 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina slowly began to shape.7 
Following the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995, 
which was committed in the presence of Dutch UN 
peacekeepers, perceptions of the entire international 
community in Bosnia, and especially among the 
Bosniaks, was further shaken.8 Concerns were 
expressed whether the ICTY, as yet another 
representative of the international community, was 
actually up to the task of delivering justice at all, 
and if so, for whom.9 During the war period the 
ICTY largely focused on building up its credibility 
at the international level and obtaining cooperation 
of states, while being obstructed and largely 
dismissed by powerful individuals in the region. 
The image of the ICTY painted from 1993 until the 
mid-1996, which was relatively uniform across the 
                                                                
4 Oslobođenje, Genocidna banda na djelu, 24 
December 1994 available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/668437. 
5  Oslobođenje, Dometi optužnice, 26 July 1995 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/440796.   
6 Ibid.  
7 Oslobođenje, Pravda sustiže zločince, 14 February 
1995, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/510464. 
8 Oslobođenje, Posljednja opomena, 13 July 1995 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/449933; 
Oslobođenje, Međunarodna zajednica odobrila 
genocide, 28 July 1995. 
9 Oslobođenje, Politički spletkaroši, 16 July 1995, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/446882; 
Oslobođenje, Sakupljači podataka, 21 October 1994 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/688952.  
ethnic groups, can be described as a strong 
scepticism towards the institution and questioning 
of its possibilities to function effectively. 
 
In 1996, Dražen Erdemović, a Bosnian Croat and a 
member of 10th sabotage detachment of the Army 
of Republic of Srpska, came forward and pleaded 
guilty for his involvement in killings during the 
Srebrenica massacre. He was the first suspect to 
surrender and his guilty verdict was the first issued 
by the ICTY. Erdemovic' willingness to testify and 
cooperate with the Tribunal (also beyond his own 
case) clearly marked a turn in the development of 
the Tribunal's activities. The judicial impasse was 
broken. In the following two years, the ICTY 
apprehended and tried low level individuals from 
all sides to the conflict: Bosnian (e.g. Mucić et al.), 
Croatian (e.g. Anto Furundžija), and Serbian (e.g. 
Duško Tadić). The media and public reacted 
relatively positively to these first trials10 as 
representatives of all parties to the conflict were 
facing justice and the veil of impunity regarding 
hands-on perpetrators was slowly being pierced. 
During 1997, however, opinions and fears were 
being expressed that prosecution of high-ranking 
individuals and those in positions of power would 
slow down the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords.11 The public and media seemed afraid that 
justice, in case it reaches beyond the small fish and 
extends to the conflict entrepreneurs and higher 
ranking individuals, would obstruct the peace 
efforts. At the end of the 1990s this relatively 
positive image of the ICTY was not disturbed. Even 
                                                                
10 Feral Tribune, Uznička Republika, 24 August 
1998 available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/602553; Feral 
Tribune, Rodna gruda, 3 March 2001; Onasa, Haški 
tribunal: D. Tadić nije kriv za ubistva, 7 May 1997 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/174440. Onasa, 
Haški tribunal: Oslobođen Z. Delalić, osuđeni Z. 
Mucić, H. Delić i E. Landžo available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/209194; Onasa, M. 
Hajrić pozdravio presudu Haškog tribunala u 
slučaju Čelebići, 16 November 1998 available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/209180; Onasa, 
Ministri srpskog entiteta u BiH najavili posjetu 
Haškom tribunalu, 25 July 1996, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/161444; Onasa, 
IFOR: H. Delić i E. Landžo danas transportovani u 
Hag, 13 June 1996, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/160072; Onasa, H. 
Solana pozdravio saradnju vlasti RS u ”akciji 
Žigić”, 17 April 1998, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/200128. 
11 Onasa, Predaja desetorice Hrvata Haškom sudu 
usporiće Dejtonski sporazum, 7 October 1997, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/181103.  
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after the Tribunal was actually starting to reach to 
the more higher-ups and arrested a couple of more 
powerful individuals such as Croatian General 
Tihomir Blaškić in 1996, Serbian General Radislav 
Krstić in 1998, or Bosnian Enver Hadžihasanović in 
2001.12 
 
However, these arrests and trials also marked the 
beginnings of ethnically divided discourses 
regarding the ICTY. Although a relatively uniform 
perception of the ICTY existed by the end of the 
20th century, indictments and trials of more and 
more powerful individuals split the image of the 
ICTY among ethnic groups. These different 
portrayals were dynamic, in a way schizophrenic, as 
they largely fluctuated on an ad-hoc, case by case 
basis, and were becoming increasingly more 
critical. Every ethnic group seemed to have 
supported the ICTY only if member(s) from other 
ethnic group was/were on trial.13 Politicians, 
divided across the ethnic lines, were on and off 
praising and/or criticising the court’s dependence 
on which group's representative was at the moment 
sitting in the dock facing judges in The Hague. The 
image of the ICTY thus became largely pluralistic 
and divided.14 Every individual, ethnic and regional 
group(s) had a different judgment about the court. 
 
In 2005 Bosnian General Sefer Halilović was 
acquitted and Bosniaks saw it as victory.15 The 
sense of victory was further reinforced in 2008 
when the ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed the 
conviction of Naser Orić and acquitted him. In 
contrast, when in 2008 Bosnian General Rasim 
                                                                
12 Nezavisne novine, Odgovorni za ratni zločin u 
Ahmićima moraju pred sud, 5 August 2004 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/24444; Dani, 
Gospodin Krajišnik je proglašen manje-više krivim, 
29 September 2006, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/272710; Nezavisne 
novine, Nastavak suđenja oficirima bivše Armije 
RBiH, 10 January 2005, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/17026. 
13Onasa, M. Kovačević juče doživio moždani udar, 
18 July 1997, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/177312; Onasa, J. 
Divjak: Armija BiH nije organizovala genocide, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/181412; Feral 
tribune, Zborno mjesto Scheveningen, 10 
November 2001 available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/181412.  
14 Nezavisne novine, Preispitati saradnju sa Hagom, 
19 October 2007. 
15 Slobodna Bosna, Spektakularna proslava 
oslobađanja Sefera Halilovića trajala do zore, 24 
November 2005, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/191165. 
Delić was convicted for war crimes, Bosniaks 
fiercely criticized the judgment as "equalizing the 
(roles of) aggressor and defender.”16 That same 
public perception of injustice, whenever a Bosniak 
faced a conviction,17 has remained to date. 
 
Although unsatisfied with the outcome of the 
Halilović case, Croats did not deny the crimes 
committed during the war in Bosnia.18 They, 
however, criticized the ICTY for prosecuting high-
ranking Croats. The crimes were according to Croat 
politicians committed by rogue soldiers and other 
low-level individuals without any preconceived 
plan or policy.19 Any reference to high level 
planning, ordering or joint criminal enterprise 
involving the State, political or military authorities 
from the Croatian side was largely disputed and 
dismissed. This culminated after general Tihomir 
Blaškić was convicted for committing, planning, 
ordering and failing to prevent crimes committed in 
Lašva valley and sentenced to 45 years 
imprisonment in 2000. His convictions were largely 
reversed on appeal, using evidence newly disclosed 
by the Croatian state, and his sentence reduced to 9 
years imprisonment. Relatedly, Croatian authorities 
fiercely opposed to the classification of Bosnian 
war as international armed conflict (established by 
the ICTY in the Blaškić case, but also in Naletilić 
and Martinović), as that implied participation of the 
                                                                
16 http://www.infobiro.ba/article/26499.  
17 According to Mirko Klarin, Serbs comprised 
68% of ICTY indictees, with 21% being Croat, 4% 
Bosniak, 4% Albanians, 1% Macedonian and 2% 
unknown. See Mirko Klarin, ‘The Impact of the 
ICTY trials on public opinion in the former 
Yugoslavia’, 7(1) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 89-96, at p. 92 (2009). 
18 Nezavisne novine, Osudili presudu Haliloviću, 19 
October 2007, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/382241. 
19Telegram.hr, Koliko sam ga poznavao, Praljak 
nije bio ratni zločinac, ali hrvatska strana u Bosni 





Vecernji.hr, 'Beograd nije podržavao zločine u BiH, 
Zagreb jest', 1 December 2017, available here: 
https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/franjo-tudjman-
slobodan-praljak-jadranko-prlic-bih-haaski-sud-
1211235;Faktor, Grabar-Kitarović: Neki naši 
sunarodnjaci su činili zločine, ali Hrvatska nije bila 
agresor, i dalje ćemo biti prijatelj BiH, 30 
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Croatian state in the war.20 Whenever this issue 
came to the fore, the ICTY was labelled as an 
unjust and political institution.21 The acquittals of 
Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen 
Markač in 2012 led to large scale celebrations. 
They were largely conceived as the sign of 
collective vindication of the Croatian State and 
removal of collective stigma of Croatian people.22 
However, these imageries now stand in stark 
contrast to what followed. In the final judgment 
against Croatian military officials in Prlić et al. in 
November 2017, when the final verdict was largely 
overshadowed by Praljak's suicide, the ICTY 
confirmed convictions of all defendants for their 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise 
confirming the link between the then Croatian 
government to crimes on the ground. Following this 
misrepresentation of "facts and historical truth" by 
the ICTY, the court was dismissed by Croat 
representatives as a political institution that 
established unjust practice towards them.23 
 
As of 2001, the trial judgment against Serbian 
general Radislav Krstić for genocide in Srebrenica 
started shaping (a negative) image of the ICTY 
among (Bosnian) Serbs. As a majority of Bosniaks 
was acquitted or convicted to relatively lenient 
sentences by the ICTY, and only a small number of 
Croats was convicted (relative to Serbs), the 
Tribunal was portrayed by the Serbian media and 
politicians as a biased court that "was designed to 
try only Serbs.“24 “[T]here is no human being that 
                                                                
20 Feral Tribune, Grobna gruda, 3 March 2001, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/606804; Slobodna 
Bosna, Sud u Haagu po prvi put uvažio Tuđmanove 
transkripte, 3 April 2003, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/281086..  
21 Nezavisne novine, Sud u Hagu politički, 2 
December 2005, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/137993. 
22 Balkaninsight, Hrvatska se nada odbacivanju 





17-2017; Vesti.rs, Reagovanja na presudu Gotovini 
i Markaču, available here: 
https://www.vesti.rs/Hag/Reagovanja-na-presudu-
Gotovini-i-Markacu-4.html, 16 November 2012.  
23 Balkaninsight, Croatia rejects party of Bosnian-
Croats verdict, 29 November 2017, available here: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-
rejects-party-of-bosnian-croats-verdict-11-29-2017. 
24 Dnevni avaz, Haški tribunal nazvali političkim 
sudom, 17 December 2008, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/522697; Nezavisne 
novine, Haški sud kao nagrada, 27 November 2007, 
we [Serbs] can convince that the Hague Tribunal is 
not a political but a legal court.”25 When Momčilo 
Krajišnik was convicted in 2006, Milorad Dodik (a 
former prime minister and current president of the 
Republika of Srpska) stated: “It is embarrassing 
that Naser Orić received a ridiculously low, almost 
acquittal verdict, while Krajišnik received 27 years 
in prison, which shows that the criteria of the ICTY 
are not identical to all.”26 Indeed, in 2007 only 7% 
of Serbian citizens thought that the ICTY was 
unbiased.27 This image of the Tribunal was further 
reinforced after the above mentioned acquittals of 
high-ranking Croatian generals Gotovina and 
Markač. In reaction, the Serb representatives firmly 
stated that the ICTY ,lost all credibility”.28 In 2013 
after the ICTY Appeals Chamber acquitted General 
Momčilo Perišić for crimes that occurred in Bosnia 
and Croatia, there were ad-hoc reports of some 
restored "faith in the tribunal's neutrality“ among 
Serbs.29 For large part, however, the ICTY image 
among the Serbs remained bleak. In Serbian 
imagination, the ICTY was generally anti-Serb and 
a political court. This imagery of "Serbian 
victimhood" was further reinforced after the 
convictions of Radovan Karadžić in 2016 and that 
of Ratko Mladić in 2017, and was not shaken by, 
yet another controversial, acquittal of Vojislav 
Šešelj in 2016. The reaction to Šešelj's acquittal 
among Serbs was largely framed around his own 
personal legal capabilities and skills in "defeating" 
the Tribunal and being able to remove any guilt 
from his shoulders.30 For Serbs the ICTY remained 
an unjust and political court and those convicted 
were largely considered martyrs and heroes. 
 
                                                                                             
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/393382. 
25 This argument is supported by the alleged public 
opinion polls where allegedly 76 percent of Serbs 
argued that ICTY is a political court. Oslobođenje, 
Građani Srbije ne vjeruju Haškom tribunalu, 6 July 
2007, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/471304. 
26 Nezavisne novine, Oprečne reakcije u RS i FBiH, 
27 September 2006, available here: 
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Oprecne-
reakcije-u-RS-i-FBiH/499. 
27 See Klarin, supra note 17.  
28 See Vesti. Vesti.rs, supra note 22.  
29 BBC, Momcilo Perisic, Yugoslav army chief 
conviction overturned, 28 February 2013 available 
here: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
21621242.  
30 Nezavisne novine, Dnevnik srpskih izbora, 8 
April 2016, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/935194; Dnevni 
avaz, Glasnogovornik zločina, 2 April 2016, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/933076.   
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Also representatives of the other two ethnic groups 
did not seem to uncritically celebrate the guilty 
verdicts against the leaders of their wartime 
enemies as undisputed victories. The discourse of 
Bosniak and Croat victim representatives over time 
became much more nuanced, multifaceted and also 
more and more critical. It was not enough that the 
enemy war-time power holders were convicted and 
sent to prison. The legal narrative and framing of 
the crimes constructed in the ICTY judgments were 
contested and criticized as misrepresenting the 
character of crimes committed during the war in 
Bosnia. Bosniaks (and in some way Croats) saw 
these judgments only as a partial justice, because 
only one temporal (1995) and spatial element (area 
of Srebrenica) of atrocities was labelled as 
genocide. All the other practices of ethnic cleansing 
and crimes committed in Bosnian municipalities 
were considered 'merely' crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. In addition, Šešeljs' acquittal was 
seen as a mockery of justice by victims in both 
Bosnia and Croatia.31 The ICTY in the eyes of the 
Bosniaks was not consistent in its practices.32 The 
ICTY practices of early release of those convicted 
caused additional outrage as, it was reported in the 
media, "there is no justice, criminals are on the 
loose“ and for that Theodor Meron and the ICTY 
was considered responsible.33  
 
Representatives of all three ethnic sides involved in 
the 1990's conflict agree that the ICTY was a ride 
on a roller coaster. They also agree that the 
Tribunal did not contribute to societal, inter-ethnic 
reconciliation.34 The Tribunal indisputably has had 
a significant impact beyond the legal realm, be it on 
a political and societal level. As very briefly 
discussed above, the Court's judgments were over 
time increasingly more often than not followed by 
politics of contestation and the ICTY served as an 
elixir to nationalist politicians. The image(s) and 
imageries of the ICTY were designed and shaped 
on the basis of (ethno)nationalistic and other 
ideological interests of politicians and media. What 
these images and imageries say about the ICTY's 
(alternative?) legacies beyond its courtroom, 
beyond the legal realm and beyond the international 
sphere, remains to be determined.  
 
                                                                
31 Dnevni avaz,, Obrukao Hag, 1 April 2016, 
available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/933063. 
32 Ibid..  
33 Dnevni avaz, Krik žrtava: za nas nema pravde, 13 
November 2014, available here: 
http://www.infobiro.ba/article/903786.  
34 Nezavisne novine, Haška (ne)Pravda, 4 April 




Ethiopian “Red Terror” trial in The 
Hague – the case of Eshetu Alemur 
By: Thijs Bouwknegt 
 
At the time The Hague’s "international justice 
bubble” was rejoicing the grandeur of the 
UNICTY’s “legacy”, the city’s District Court 
rendered its latest war crimes verdict on 15 
December 2017. A second of its kind in 2017 
(Kouwenhoven re. Liberia and Guinea), it virtually 
went unobserved. Absent from the courtroom 
during sentencing at the Court was the main 
character, the accused, now convict: Eshetu Alemu. 
It was in protest against his expected life sentence 
for mass atrocities in Ethiopia, 39 years ago. The 
10-day trial before the ‘International Crimes 
Chamber’ was one of the most intense, unique and 
historical trials I attended in the past 15 years. After 
39 years, eight victims shared their grievances 
before foreign judges. In time and space, the crime 
scene was distant. In the dock sat a conversational, 
intelligent but unsettled perpetrator. 
 
As the UNICTY had only just issued its first arrest 
warrant, no less than 44 men appeared in a 
courtroom in Addis Ababa. At the “African 
Nuremberg”, on 13 December 1994, the members 
of the former ultra-communist regime (the Derg) 
heard genocide charges relating to the mass 
persecution and murder of political opponents in 
the late 1970s. One of the defendants was Melaku 
Tefera, the “butcher” of Gondar. His reign was 
murderous, his campaigns against “contra-
revolutionaries” tormenting. In 1977, the 23-year 
old Alemu was Tefera’s assistant, acquiring the 
tricks of the trade, delivering “revolutionary 
measures.” In the next year, Alemu took office in 
the nationalised palace of Debre Marcos, from 
where he governed his own province, Gojam. Like 
Tefara, Alemu was charged by the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) for similar atrocity 
crimes and in the same mega trial (73 defendants in 
total) in the 1990's. However, by then he was 
already in the Netherlands, as a refugee, working as 
a nursing intern in a hospital in Amsterdam. Like 
many Ethiopians from the feared military junta, 
including its leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, Alemu 
was tried in absentia.  
 
In 1998, when Alemu had obtained Dutch 
citizenship, his SPO case was heard back home. 
Dozens of documents from the Derg’s scrupulously 
documented security offices were tendered, 
witnesses put Alemu at the scene of ghastly mass 
executions. These details came to the attention of 
the Dutch only briefly, in a report published in a 
Dutch weekly, in which copies of Ethiopian death 
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lists were published; all annotated, signed and 
stamped by Alemu. An Ethiopian witness 
recognised a name on the list of a man who had a 
nail hammered through his hand, from which he 
then was to drink his own blood. Yet, in the 
absence of an extradition treaty with Ethiopia and a 
specialised war crimes unit in the Netherlands to 
probe international crimes in far-off place, the 
information was shelved. Alemu lingered in 
impunity and lived in a flat building in Amstelveen 
while Ethiopian courts convicted him twice. In 
2000 he received the death penalty for murdering 
197 people and in 2003 he was convicted for 
genocide, for which he received “rigorous 
imprisonment for life.” 
 
Only in 2009, a year after the conclusion of 
Ethiopia’s mega-trial, which also convicted 
Mengistu, would a new, large and ambitious 
International Crimes Unit reopen the cold case of 
Alemu in the Netherlands. In 2013, police 
investigators retrieved some 214 pages of copies 
from Alemu’s SPO file (including witness 
statements) in Ethiopia. But it was the only 
evidence obtained on the ground. Unhappy with the 
Dutch refusal to extradite the génocidaire, Ethiopia 
ceased cooperation in 2015. Isolated from the crime 
scene, the criminal examination shifted to the USA, 
Canada and the Netherlands, where 28 witnesses 
were questioned, including Alemu’s ex-wife, 
children and old friends. An undercover agent 
spoke to Alemu, while his phone was wire-tapped. 
However, foundational evidence came from 
victims’ testimonies gathered in north America. On 
that basis, Alemu was arrested at his home on 29 
September 2015 and an investigative judge heard 
the testimony of 18 witnesses, now including an 
historian, handwriting expert and former SPO 
Prosecutor. Slated to commence in 2016, the trial 
was delayed for a year after Alemu changed his 
defence team. 
 
From 30 October 2017 onwards, the 10-day trial 
was a summoning of and rendez-vous with the past. 
But historical scores are hard to settle. Not all 
victims are ready to face the authors of their 
suffering. In the corridors of The Hague District 
Court building, an Ethiopian lady was writing a 
message in a small bible. “I want to give it to him,” 
she says. “I feel pity for the man, […] He needs 
forgiveness and I am ready to give it to him, 
through God.” A man next to her, sees it 
differently. “My justice is in there.” He points at the 
big brown door of the courtroom number E1, where 
he had attended all hearings. “You do not know 
what I have seen,” he tells the lady, who softly 
replies: “My hands and legs were tied together and I 
was pulled up to hang from the ceiling of a prison 
cell. I was 13 years old.” 
The lady was not the only school student who fell 
victim to a pattern of persecution, torture and abuse 
during the “Red Terror.” Gruesome stories like 
these filled the courtroom, time and again. Their 
alleged protagonist, an aged man of flesh and 
blood, wearing a padded jacket, jeans and Nike 
trainers, was sitting in dock. In the soberly 
decorated courtroom, sitting under a prominent 
portrait of King Willem Alexander, the Chamber 
discussed his dossier. “Good morning, Mr. Alemu.” 
“Good afternoon Mr. Alemu.” Dressed in a black 
toga with a white bib, the Court’s President, Judge 
Mariette Renckens, greets him. Every time he is 
brought into court through a side door - sturdy, 
tenacious and flanked by two police officers - 
Alemu nods at the bench, strides to his black 
stacking chair and participates vigorously in his 
trial. From the start he had settled with the outcome 
of the proceedings. “I accept your judgement, I 
accept it.” 
 
Indeed, by virtue of his position, as a superior, he 
was responsible by default. Besides, the allegations 
were too prodigious to deny. One of the largest 
Dutch criminal trials ever, Alemu faced a catalogue 
of atrocities, chaptered in four war crimes charges 
under a 1952 law. What transpires from the case is 
that Alemu had no taste for due process and 
international human rights, concepts of which he 
had “no knowledge” in 1978. A former army nurse 
and private, he became a disciple of the charismatic 
Mengistu. Alemu too was all about the revolution 
as he had grown up poor in “miserable” Addis 
Ababa. A vocal student, he made his way up in the 
Derg, even travelling to Moscow and Havana. 
Alemu, who had a natural talent for public 
speaking, became an important conveyer of 
Marxism in Gojjam. Driven around by a personal 
chauffeur and escorted by bodyguards, Alemu 
would educate locals at public gatherings, 
something he says he was “good at” and “proud 
of.” 
 
At the trial, victims memorised Alemu as a young 
viceroy, a man with power, a superior to kadres, 
kebeles and policemen. However, according to 
witnesses, Alemu’s speeches were not at all about 
propaganda or indoctrination. No, they claim they 
must have been “exposure meetings”, mass-
meetings where people were forced to confess they 
were anti-Derg, reactionaries, counter-
revolutionaries and were sent to prison, where often 
they were killed by the kebele-militia. After at least 
one such meeting in late February 1978, Alemu 
sanctioned his men to round up 321 people, mostly 
students, sometimes as young as twelve years old. 
None of them received an indictment or a trial. All 
were sent to what witnesses described as a “prison 
camp” at the Debre Marcos’ police bureau, which 
was under Alemu’s helm. 
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One jail is featured specifically in the trial: 
Demmelash. The facility was located right at the 
foot of the hill where Alemu’s Palace office was. 
“We were kept at his feet, literally,” a past captive 
attested during the trial. In the unsanitary “dark 
rooms” at Demmelash, the detainees received no 
medical attention, were served unpalatable food and 
dirty drinking water. At some point, the juvenile 
captives were shackled together at night. When one 
would move, all woke up. There were countless 
restless nights. On one day, a forced labourer had 
an ‘x’ carved on his back with the bayonet on a 
Kalashnikov. Maltreatment and torture were the 
rule rather than the exception in Demmelash. In the 
months to pass, according to the judgement, at least 
six prisoners faced these type of “revolutionary 
measures”, including YT (anonymised), a student. 
During trial, he testified that he was relentlessly 
molested by guards and special interrogators, 
people who were to report to Alemu. YT and other 
witnesses testified that there was kicking, whipping 
with a ‘giraffe’ (a kind of whip) or even spoons. 
Prisoners were hit on their faces, private parts, soles 
of their naked feet. The torture has left YT’s “left 
ear ringing.” Next to this degrading, inhumane and 
deadly maltreatment, at least 75 prisoners were 
strangulated to death on 14 August 1978, on the 
orders of Alemu. The crime scene was a church 
building at Demmelash. After the massacre, 
executed by those under Alemu’s superior 
responsibility, at least 240 identified prisoners were 
continued to be detained and mishandled, until at 
least 31 December 1981. 
 
The outcome of the trial – a war crimes conviction 
for arbitrary detention in cruel and degrading 
circumstances, torture and killing, which resulted in 
a sentence of life imprisonment and reparations 
awarded to five victims – was no surprise. But it 
was particularly the trial as such, that was unique, 
intense and intimate. Different from the distant, 
symbolic and elite justice rendered at the 
international tribunals and courts, these proceedings 
were tangible, at least to those present, through 
interpretation when necessary. For most days, the 
single space of one small courtroom was packed, in 
silence. At the bench, including the registry, sat 
seven women and one man (an alternate judge). 
Three trial judges, two prosecutors, Alemu and his 
two defence lawyers were the main protagonists. 
Two lawyers represented the victims, some of 
whom flew over from north America. They sat 
closely, listening attentively, holding on to the 
printouts of their statements, just 2 metres away 
from their former tormentor. On one day, they were 
given the floor, to narrate their ordeals, to show 
their pain and to await Alemu’s response from the 
dock. The atmosphere was mostly tense. One 
victim walked out of court in tears as Alemu were 
shifting his personal responsibility to the Derg, as a 
regime and organisation. 
 
Also unique was the fact that defendant spoke 
elaborately, answering a barrage of questions from 
the bench. “I am not here to defend the Derg, Derg-
members, or the Derg leader, I am here to defend 
myself.” In the history of international(ised) justice, 
where lawyers usually do the talking for 
defendants, that is an absolute rarity. Only a 
handful of trials – such as Adolf Eichmann, 
Slobodan Milosevic, Duch and Charles Taylor – 
provided a space for the accused to place their 
perspectives, insights, even emotions, at the heart of 
the trial. If trials could serve as a lens into the 
minds of perpetrators, Alemu’s case must become a 
resource for students in this field. For in the dock 
sat a struggling man, 63 years old, obviously 
presenting to the bench a counter-narrative, a 
human face, to the prosecution’s depiction of him 
as a monster. While doing just that, one observes a 
troubled man, Chameleon-like, adjusting to his 
various audiences. First and foremost, he had to 
make sure that in their intimate convictions, the 
judges would find him not guilty, while also not 
offending the victims in the courtroom. At the same 
time, he needed to rationalise, formulate and narrate 
his past acts and omissions to himself. 
 
Through the trial, in a live setting, Alemu was 
balancing out all the factors. In his own words, he 
used his “last breaths” to do that. At times he was 
repentant, asking the victims for forgiveness. All 
atrocities troubled him, shocked him. His time had 
come to face them once more. Simultaneously, we 
saw a defiant man. He “did not do it” himself nor 
did he know abuses were going on under his watch: 
“I would have stopped it,” he said, “punished the 
perpetrators.” In fact, he was never in Demmelash, 
he argued. In one of his versions, witnesses confuse 
him with another man; an infamous special 
interrogator from Addis Ababa, Eshetu Andergie. 
“You have the wrong man in front of you,” he told 
the chamber. “It wasn’t me!” At times, Alemu got 
agitated: “I already told you a 100 times.” 
Disturbed by his past, Alemu showed several faces. 
He felt sorry for those who had suffered. But he 
also believed that the Marxist ideology had good 
intentions. On the other hand, Alemu came to 
accept that the ideology caused more suffering than 
prosperity to his beloved country. For that he feels 
guilty. But then he turned again: “If I was guilty of 
the atrocities myself I could not live with myself, I 
would be an animal.” His only explanation is that 
he was guilty by the “virtue of [his] membership of 
the Derg and that now, after 39 years, in the dock 
and in the media became the “Black sheep of all 
that had happened.”  
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Meanwhile, Alemu has appealed the verdict and 
sentence, which means the case will see additional 
investigations and proceed to a second trial round, 
now at The Hague Appeals Court.  To be continued 
here in this newsletter. 
 
Burundi bids agues to the Rome Statute 
Justice System – What’s next for 
criminal accountability in Burundi?  
By: James Nyawo  
 
There is a popular, African Proverb that says, ‘if 
you think you are too small to make a difference, 
you haven’t spent the night with a mosquito.’ Could 
it be that the decision by the Government of 
Burundi to leave the Rome Statute Justice system is 
a testimony that small as Burundi is, it is ready to 
spearhead an en masse withdrawal of African State 
Parties from the International Criminal Court? Until 
now the carols for withdrawal of African States 
Parties have not been seriously acted upon. As such 
it is too early to see whether Burundi’s withdrawal 
will have any infectious effect on other African 
States Parties. 
 
Burundi’s initial cohorts in withdrawing from the 
Rome Statute; South Africa and Gambia changed 
their course of action prior to the lapsing of the one-
year period after submitting their written 
notifications. In South Africa, where, the rule of 
law and separation of powers are still resilient, the 
Supreme Court held that the Executive arm of 
Government’s decision to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute had violated the South African Constitution. 
In Gambia, the regime change that saw President 
Adama Barrow taking over power at the beginning 
of 2017 tilted the fortunes in favour of Gambia 
remaining a State Party to the Rome Statute. One of 
the new President’s first official acts was to reverse 
the decision made by his predecessor for Gambia to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
 
Other African State Parties that had made 
pronouncements about withdrawing from the Rome 
Statute, yet were short of taking concrete steps 
include Kenya, Namibia and Zambia. In 2017, the 
African Union Assembly meeting in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, adopted a decision on the International 
Criminal Court, which included its acceptance of 
the ‘ICC Withdrawal Strategy and a call for the 
African Member States to consider implementing 
the strategy’s recommendations.’ A total of sixteen 
African States registered their reservations on the 
decision. The States are; Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia 
and Zambia.  This was the first time that an African 
Union decision on the ICC had received such 
number of reservations. 
 
As it is, the suggestion could be that the 
International Criminal Court and its proponents 
need not to spend sleepless nights because of 
Burundi’s withdrawal. However, if we are to 
consider that only one African State Party, 
Botswana, had ratified the Amendments on the 
crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which was activated 
during the Sixteenth Assembly of States Parties in 
New York 2017, we have to admit that Africa’s 
initial enthusiasm of the Rome Statute Justice 
system is dwindling.  
 
Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute took 
effect on 27 October 2017; a year after it had 
submitted its written notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the depositary of the 
Rome Statute. This is in conformity with Article 
127 of the Rome Statute. Burundi’s written 
notification does not provide any justifications for 
its decision to withdraw. In any case provision of 
justifications is not part of the withdrawal 
procedures in the Rome Statute. The best source of 
official explanation available to us is in the 
statement delivered by Ambassador Vestine 
Nahimana during the Assembly of States Parties in 
2017. In the statement Burundi’s decision was 
based on what it considered to be a combination of 
‘systematic violation of the Rome Statute’ and its 
concern on the lack of independence of the Office 
of the Prosecutor in the handling of the situation in 
Burundi.  
 
Nevertheless, the withdrawal does not have non-
retroactive effect. This means Burundi is still 
expected to fulfil its obligations arising from the 
period when it was a State Party. That period is 
between 2004 and 2018. The obligations include 
clearing the outstanding financial contributions to 
the International Criminal Court. In addition, the 
fact that in November 2017, just a month after 
Burundi had given its written notification to 
withdraw, the Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the 
Office of the Prosecutor to officially open 
investigations regarding the crimes committed 
between, April 2015 until October 2017, means that 
in theory Burundi still has the obligation to 
cooperate with the Court in this regard. It is hard to 
envisage how in practical terms this will unfold 
considering that Burundi had registered its 
discontent with the Court and the Office of the 
Prosecutor in particular. It is also common 
knowledge that within the Rome Statute, there is 
little that could be done when a State Party fails or 
decides to contravene its obligations. Unless there 
is going to be drastic changes either in Burundi or 
within the United Nations Security Council as far as 
ensuring compliance with Rome Statute 
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obligations, it is fair to say, accountability for the 
alleged atrocities is likely to be long and agonising 
process for both the victims and high priests of 
international criminal justice.   
 
If Burundi’s justification for withdrawal as stated 
by Ambassador Nahimana is to be given weight, 
then perhaps, an alternative mechanism for 
accountability, outside the Rome Statute Justice 
System may have to be considered. Prior to the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
Burundi had indicated and was interested that it 
even requested for the establishment of an ad hoc 
tribunal to assist in the investigations and 
prosecutions of international crimes committed in 
its territory. Such a request was repeated by the 
Burundian delegation during the Rome Conference 
in 1998. As such there might be some value in 
exploring this as an alternative. The main advantage 
an ad hoc tribunal would have over the Rome 
Statute is that it would come under the direct 
authority and support of the United Nations 
Security Council, which could be useful in terms of 
ensuring cooperation. Another alternative to 
consider could be to equip the East African 
Community Court of Justice with criminal 
jurisdiction so that it can investigate and prosecute 
those responsible of atrocities committed in 
Burundi. Such a mechanism could also be used to 
ensure accountability in South Sudan. 
 
In the meantime, the dialogue towards addressing 
some of the key issues behind the growing friction 
between African States and the International 
Criminal Court must be intensified and at all levels, 
at political level, legal level, academic and civil 
society. It is clear that as we approach the 20-year 
mark since the adoption of the Rome Statute the 
nature of dialogue that has occurred has not been 
candid enough to sustain the African States’ 
enthusiasm for the Rome Statute Justice System. 
Burundi’s withdrawal might be inconsequential, 
although it might have also opened a window for a 
serious introspection of the Rome Statute Justice 
Mechanism.  
 
Bangladesh and Rohingya Refugees; 
navigating international protection and 
national security 
By Joris van Wijk 
 
Rohingya are one of the most persecuted people in 
the world today. Systematically targeted, tortured 
and butchered by the Myanmar government and 
denied citizenship and socio-economic and cultural 
rights for decades, Rohingya people have been 
fleeing to adjoining states, including Bangladesh, 
for a long time. Since late 2016 more than 500.000 
Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar in response 
to the latest outbreak of violence in the province of 
Rakhine State. During a special session of the 
Human Rights Council early December 2017, Zeid 
Ra’ad al-Hussein, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, did not rule out 
that the latest round of violence – “acts of appalling 
barbarity” – present elements of genocide.35 This 
short contribution does not delve into possible 
characterization of atrocities committed against 
Rohingya in Myanmar as one form of international 
crimes or another. Rather it explores and briefly 
outlines dilemmas and challenges faced by 
Rohingya after fleeing the violence. It outlines how 
massive refugee flows are perceived by 
Bangladeshi authorities and society as a threat to 
national security and how the plight of Rohingya 
seems to be far from over, even after taking 'refuge' 
away from the imminent massacres and ethnic 
cleansing. 
 
The far majority of recent Rohingya refugees 
settled down in neighbouring Bangladesh, where 
they have been living in a range of different refugee 
camps. They joined a group of an estimated 
500.000 Rohingya who had already fled to 
Bangladesh before the current crisis (Hasnat et al. 
2017). Once in Bangladesh, the plight of the 
Rohingya does not come to an end. While being 
freed from the immediate fear of being killed, 
Rohingya find themselves in subhuman conditions 
with inadequate food supply, health care and 
sanitation prevalent in the refugee camps. 
Furthermore, while the popular public imagination 
including the government bodies view the 
Rohingya with a degree of sympathy, they are also 
construed in Bangladeshi media and mainstream 
perception as a potential threat to the social and 
moral order of Bangladeshi society. For example, 
local media have often blamed the Rohingya for the 
rising levels of crime in the Cox’s Bazaar, the area 
that boasts the majority of the Rohingya while there 
are reports of Rohingya women facing ‘forced 
prostitution’ in the camps.36 Furthermore, the 
Rohingya exodus is increasingly portrayed as a 
possible security threat. Illustrative are the recent 
remarks by Asaduzzaman Khan, Bangladesh's 
minister of Home Affairs. Emphasizing that 
Bangladesh feels a strong humanitarian obligation 
to assist the Rohingya, he worries about 
international terror organisations recruiting 
refugees: "It'll be our threat in the future. These 
people left everything (….) For their survival, they 
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will do anything.”37 These remarks and worries 
recall Astri Suhrke’s findings on ‘refugee warriors’: 
individuals in exile may find that the most socially 
meaningful and economically rewarding activity is 
to join militants, and refugee camps may serve as 
potential military bases from which insurgencies 
take place (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989). 
 
In response, the government of Bangladesh has 
suggested to introduce voluntary sterilisation in its 
overcrowded Rohingya camps38 and expressed 
plans to develop an isolated, flood-prone island in 
the Bay of Bengal to temporarily house tens of 
thousands of Rohingya.39 On 23 November 2017 
Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to organize the 
return of Rohingya within two months, but mid- 
December still more Rohingya are moving from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh then the other way 
around.40 There are, in other words, little 
indications that the plight of the Rohingya will be 
over any time soon.  
 
The coup that wasn’t a coup: Robert 
Mugabe steps down 
By: Maartje Weerdesteijn 
 
“We wish to make it abundantly clear that this is 
not a military takeover” said General Moyo on 15 
November 2017, in what has been called “the 
world’s strangest coup”. With military vehicles in 
the streets and the head of state under house arrest, 
the man in uniform who had just taken over one of 
Zimbabwe’s major news stations, lacked 
credibility. On twitter, commentators decided that 
“If it looks like a coup, walks like a coup and 
quacks like a coup, then it's a coup,” but confusion 
rose when it did not immediately become clear 
whether the military wanted to oust Mugabe. The 
coup that wasn’t a coup, however, signalled the end 
of Mugabe’s reign. He caved on November 21st 
2017, as his own party turned on him and 
parliamentary procedures were put in place to 
remove him from power. After 37 years Mugabe’s 
reign came to an end. 















The ambiguous nature of the coup is perhaps most 
logically explained by the tough stance that African 
Union (AU) has been taking in relation to military 
take-over of power on the continent. Its chair, and 
president of Guinea, Alpha Condé, was quick to 
warn that the AU would “never accept a coup d’état 
in Zimbabwe.” However, as support in the country 
for the military take-over grew, the AU soon 
moderated its tone. 
 
The AU’s mild stance was perhaps facilitated by 
the pretence of legality. While seen as an illegal 
power grab by most, the Zimbabwean High Court 
ruled that the intervention was legal in the days 
following Mugabe’s resignation. These 
developments coincided with several worrisome 
incidents, that included allegations of serious 
human rights violations and it is, therefore, 
questionable whether the current transfer of power 
should be seen in a positive light. 
 
The coup attempt was sparked by the firing of vice-
president Emmerson Mnangagwa which was 
probably intended to position Mugabe’s wife Grace 
as his successor. Mnangagwa now has taken the 
reigns of power, giving prominent positions to army 
officials, and will inherit the dictatorial institutions 
that he himself helped to create. He has been at 
Mugabe’s side since the very beginning. He fought 
for liberation alongside Mugabe and is alleged to 
have been instrumental in the Gukurahundi 
Matabeleland and Midlands massacres in which 
approximately 20,000 people lost their lives in an 
attempt to wipe out the support base of the 
opposition. He played an important role in the 
previous regime, rigging the elections and 
implementing a brutal security regime. His 
ruthlessness has earned him the nickname “the 
Crocodile.” 
 
Mnangagwa promised to hold free and fair elections 
by mid-2018 but the question is whether he is truly 
willing to risk losing since he is feared, not loved, 
among the population. It is difficult to imagine that 
the man who planned and executed some of 
Mugabe’s most brutal policies can spark a new 
beginning. While Mugabe will continue to live a 
life of luxury, the people of Zimbabwe will likely 
continue to experience hardship. 
 
Zimbabwe has been here before. When Mugabe 
won the war of independence from the white 
minority regime of Ian Smith he also inherited the 
non-democratic institutions of its predecessor that 
some say have been influential in shaping his brutal 
regime. Now it’s Mnangagwa’s turn to use the 
dictatorial state-structure for his own benefit. With 
a leader that executed Mugabe’s most brutal 
policies over the past 37 years, and with a high 
court that effectively legitimized military 
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interventions in the country’s domestic politics, 





Interviewing Islamic State supporters 
online: challenges and benefits 
By: Pieter Nanninga 
 
Why do people support a group that has become 
infamous for its bloodshed? Since I started studying 
the Islamic State’s media releases in 2014, I have 
talked with dozens of IS supporters online – first 
occasionally, but later in a more systematic way as 
part of what could be labelled “virtual 
ethnography”. In unstructured interviews, I have 
talked with them about topics varying from 
beheadings, slavery and airstrikes to school exams, 
Arabian horses and raising toddlers. What are the 
challenges and benefits of this relatively new and 
sometimes contested form of research? 
 
Interviewing jihadis online is fascinating, 
frustrating and, above all, very insightful. Yet it is 
not without difficulties. The politicised, securitised 
and juridicalised nature of the field, as well as the 
online nature of the research, raises questions. How 
to deal with anonymity, confidentiality, informed 
consent and data management? How to keep 
balance between involvement and reflective 
detachment when talking about emotionally 
charged topics? How do I know whether the 
“supporters” really are who they say they are–if 
they say so at all? 
 
Decades-long reflections of, especially, 
anthropologists on methodological and ethical 
aspects of fieldwork, including online interviewing, 
have provided me with some guidelines. For 
example, whereas informed consent forms are not 
workable, I approach my informants transparently, 
using public accounts showing my name, affiliation 
and website, and being open with regard to my 
position and aims. The role of the researcher in the 
production and interpretation of data requires 
constant reflection and the “do-no-harm” principle 
is leading in my online research, including in the 
storing and sharing of (anonymised) data. And, 
indeed, I am never one hundred percent certain 
whether the people I talk to are really the IS 
supporters they claim to be. Yet I am convinced 
that I can make a fairly good assessment of their 
credibility based on long-time connections, lengthy 
conversations and knowledge of their position 
within the online jihadi community.  
 
These answers may not always be completely 
satisfactory. However, the study of jihadism suffers 
from a major lack of first-hand empirical research. 
Offline fieldwork among (active) jihadis is often 
not doable, which is true for IS in particular. 
Nevertheless, talking to jihadis is crucial to 
understand why people participate in or support 
groups like these. One could argue that, to a certain 
extent, we have to make do with what we have. Yet 
I would contend that online research is more than a 
second-best option. It provides different data than 
traditional fieldwork. 
 
First of all, participating in jihadis’ online 
environment, observing their online behaviour and 
engaging in private conversations offers insights 
into their online life, which is often highly 
significant to them. Experiencing the excitement 
within the community when IS announces a new 
video, the collective frustrations about the daily 
account suspensions and the shared outrage about 
new reports of civilian casualties due to airstrikes 
has helped me to grasp their sense of belonging to 
this (online) community, and the value thereof to 
these people. 
 
Moreover, due to the low barrier to engage in 
conversation online, contacts are usually more 
frequent than in the case of offline fieldwork 
(especially considering the many obstacles in 
interviewing jihadis offline). I am in touch with 
some IS supporters on an almost weekly basis for 
several years by now. This is necessary, for 
instance to gain trust and create a sphere of 
openness. It is also crucial to get to know the 
people you are talking to. Facial expressions, tone 
of voice and body language cannot be observed in 
online interviews. Hence, frequent contacts are 
crucial to grasp the weight of their words and make 
sense of their mood, emotions, jokes, etc. 
Moreover, it is helpful in getting beyond the 
stereotyped image of jihadis that dominate public 
perceptions. After all, developing a sense of 
empathy is crucial to good ethnography. 
 
Yet frequent contact is more than a mere 
requirement–it is also highly valuable, particularly 
in combination with the instant accessibility of 
many IS supporters online. Most supporters are 
online a lot, which enables me to start 
conversations at moments I consider worthwhile. 
Two examples illustrate the value thereof. First, I 
talked with an IS supporter during the November 
2015 Paris attacks (which lasted for almost four 
hours). Accordingly, I was able to notice his 
excitement each time a new facts (and rumours) 
emerged and clearly experienced the feeling of 
empowerment the attacks provided him with. I got 
a sense of his emotions that night, and especially 
the–for him satisfactory–feeling of revenge: the 
civilians casualties (supposedly) caused by 
coalition bombings that had often upset him were 
now retaliated against. In short, in a way that would 
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have been hardly possible via other research 
methods, online interviews enable me to better 
understand why some people celebrated the killing 
and wounding of hundreds of civilians that Friday 
evening.41 
 
Second, on 22 December 2016, IS released a video 
showing three Turkish soldiers being burned alive. 
The direct accessibility of my online network of IS 
supporters enabled me to interview one of them 
immediately after he watched the release. On my 
question what he thought about the video, he 
replied that it made him “sick to his stomach.” IS 
“really shouldn’t” publish videos like these, this 
long-time IS supporter said: “I don’t understand 
wallah, the use of this gruesome method isn’t 
needed now (even if it’s allowed).” Contrary to 
widely shared perceptions about jihadis in debates 
about radicalization, propaganda, counter-
narratives, etc., this example illustrates that they are 
not merely passive “sponges” absorbing the 
materials IS pours out over them. Instead, they are 
individuals with agency, critically evaluating their 
sources. 
 
I would probably not have received this emotional 
first response if I would have conducted an offline 
interview with this supporter some time after the 
event. This again shows the added value of online 
interviews with jihadis. Although the method 
definitely has its drawbacks, it is not a second-rate 
substitute for offline forms of ethnographic 
research. Rather, it is a valuable additional tool to 
study IS’s appeal across the world. 
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ALL RISE – TJITSKE LINGSMA  
 





‘On a grey, cold day’ in January 2011 Tjitske 
Lingsma visits the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague, The Netherlands. She hears 
the poignant testimony of a lady who tells the 
judges how she was savagely gang raped, 
experienced the looting of her house and 
neighbourhood and heard how her brother was 
killed. After this first visit Lingsma decides to 
follow the ICC, inspired by the court’s noble task to 
bring justice for victims, to fight impunity and to go 
after perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. In a vivid and gripping 
style, and with unique insights, Lingsma tells the 
story of this prestigious court, that started in 2002 
and now has 124 member states. In thematic 
chapters she portrays its history, functioning, the 
work of the prosecutor, life in detention, and the 
precarious situation of witnesses and victims. 
Lingsma describes in separate chapters the dramatic 
cases against suspects of international crimes in 
Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central 
African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. But 
reality proves to be harsh. Despite all hopes, the 
ICC has not fulfilled its ambition. So far it has 
convicted four persons for international crimes, 
while cases against no fewer than nine suspects 
failed. The court, which has cost 1.5 billion euros 
by now, is damaged by government obstruction, 
intimidation of witnesses, its own failures and 
member states threatening to withdraw. All Rise is 
the sobering account of a court that could not live 
up to its expectations. But with its important task to 
bring justice, it is too valuable to fail. The Dutch 
edition of All Rise, which was published in 
December 2014, was shortlisted for the Brusse 
Prize - for best journalistic book in The 
Netherlands’ (From Amazon website) 
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Tjitske Lingsma is a freelance journalist and author. 
Her book All Rise was first published in Dutch but 
has now been translated in English in order to reach 
a broader public. Instead of a legal analysis of its 
functioning, this book on the ICC stands out 
because it provides a very personal insight and 
gripping account into the ICC. The book takes a far 
more personal than legal approach and describes the 
people involved in the international criminal justice 
system as represented by the ICC and what the 
working of the ICC does to them. Lingsma sat in 
the public gallery and observed the trials as well as 
the other people watching the trials – she followed 
the cases and other relevant news and interviewed 
the people involved. The book is written with a 
profound interest and dedication in international 
criminal justice. It shows the ICC from a different 
perspective than we are used to. It is an excellent 
book and a must read to all people interested in the 
functioning and workings of the ICC. 
 
SELECTED NEW PUBLICATIONS  
 





The Journal of Perpetrator Research (JPR) is an 
inter-disciplinary, peer-reviewed, open access 
journal committed to promoting the scholarly study 
of perpetrators of mass killings, political violence 
and genocide. 
 
The journal fosters scholarly discussions about 
perpetrators and perpetratorship across the broader 
continuum of political violence. JPR does not 
confine its attention to any particular region or 
period. Instead, its mission is to provide a forum for 
analysis of perpetrators of genocide, mass killing 
and political violence via research taking place 
within the fields of history, criminology, law, 
forensics, cultural studies, sociology, anthropology, 
philosophy, memory studies, psychology, politics, 
literature, film studies and education. In providing 
this interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary space 
the journal moves academic research on this topic 
beyond, and between, disciplinary boundaries to 
provide a forum in which robust and interrogative 
research and cross-curricular discourse can 
stimulate lively intellectual engagement with 
perpetrators. 
 
JPR thus not only addresses issues related to 
perpetrators in the past but also responds to present 
challenges. The fundamental questions informing 
the journal include: how do we define, understand 
and encounter the figure of the perpetrator of 
political violence? What can we discern about their 
motivations, and how can that help society and 
policy-makers in countering and preventing such 
occurrences? How are perpetrators represented in a 
variety of memory spaces including art, film, 
literature, television, theatre, commemorative 




Aksenova, M. (2016). Complicity in international 
criminal law, Hart Publishing. 
 
This book tackles one of the most contentious 
aspects of international criminal law – the modes of 
liability. At the heart of the discussion is the quest 
for balance between the accused's individual 
contribution and the collective nature of mass 
offending. The principle of legality demands that 
there exists a well-defined link between the crime 
and the person charged with it. This is so even in 
the context of international offending, which often 
implies 'several degrees of separation' between the 
direct perpetrator and the person who authorises the 
atrocity. The challenge is to construct that link 
without jeopardising the interests of justice. 
 
This monograph provides the first comprehensive 
treatment of complicity within the discipline and 
beyond. Extensive analysis of the pertinent statutes 
and jurisprudence reveals gaps in interpreting 
accessorial liability. Simultaneously, the study of 
complicity becomes a test for the general methods 
and purposes of international criminal law. The 
book exposes problems with the sources of law and 
demonstrates the absence of clearly defined 
sentencing and policy rationales, which are crucial 
tools in structuring judicial discretion. 
 
Anderson, K, (2017). Perpetrating Genocide a 
criminological account, Routledge. 
 
Focusing on the relationship between the micro 
level of perpetrator motivation and the macro level 
normative discourse, this book offers an in-depth 
explanation for the perpetration of genocide. It is 
the first comparative criminological treatment of 
genocide drawn from original field research, based 
substantially on the author’s interviews with 
perpetrators and victims of genocide and mass 
atrocities, combined with wide-ranging secondary 
and archival sources. Topics covered include: 
perpetration in organizations, genocidal 
propaganda, the characteristics of perpetrators, 
decision-making in genocide, genocidal 
mobilization, coping with killing, perpetrator 
memory and trauma, moral rationalization, and 
transitional justice. 
An interdisciplinary and comparative analysis, this 
book utilizes scientific methods with the objective 
of gaining some degree of insight into the causes of 
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genocide and genocide perpetration. It is argued 
that genocide is more than a mere intellectual 
abstraction – it is a crime with real consequences 
and real victims. Abstraction and objectivity may 
be intellectual ideals but they are not ideally 
humane; genocide is ultimately about the 
destruction of humanity. Thus, this book avoids 
presenting an overly abstract image of genocide, 
but rather grounds its analysis in interviews with 
victims and perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda, 
Burundi, Uganda, Bosnia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, 
and Iraq.  
This book will be highly useful to students and 
scholars with an interest in genocide and the causes 
of mass violence. It will also be of interest to 
policy-makers engaged with the issues of genocide 
and conflict prevention. 
 
Bazyler, M. (2016) Holocaust, genocide and the 
law, Oxford University Press. 
 
A great deal of contemporary law has a direct 
connection to the Holocaust. That connection, 
however, is seldom acknowledged in legal texts and 
has never been the subject of a full-length scholarly 
work. This book examines the background of the 
Holocaust and genocide through the prism of the 
law; the criminal and civil prosecution of the Nazis 
and their collaborators for Holocaust-era crimes; 
and contemporary attempts to criminally prosecute 
perpetrators for the crime of genocide. It provides 
the history of the Holocaust as a legal event, and 
sets out how genocide has become known as the 
"crime of crimes" under both international law and 
in popular discourse. It goes on to discuss specific 
post-Holocaust legal topics, and examines the 
Holocaust as a catalyst for post-Holocaust 
international justice. Together, this collection of 
subjects establishes a new legal discipline, which 
the author Michael Bazyler labels "Post-Holocaust 
Law." 
 
Behrens, P., O. Jensen & N. Terry (eds.). (2017) 
Holocaust and genocide denial – a contextual 
perspective, Routledge. 
 
This book provides a detailed analysis of one of the 
most prominent and widespread international 
phenomena to which criminal justice systems has 
been applied: the expression of revisionist views 
relating to mass atrocities and the outright denial of 
their existence. Denial poses challenges to more 
than one academic discipline: to historians, the 
gradual disappearance of the generation of 
eyewitnesses raises the question of how to keep 
alive the memory of the events, and the fact that 
negationism is often offered in the guise of 
historical 'revisionist scholarship' also means that 
there is need for the identification of parameters 
which can be applied to the office of the 'genuine' 
historian. Legal academics and practitioners as well 
as political scientists are faced with the difficulty of 
evaluating methods to deal with denial and must in 
this regard identify the limits of freedom of speech, 
but also the need to preserve the rights of victims. 
Beyond that, the question arises whether the law 
can ever be an effective option for dealing with 
revisionist statements and the revisionist 
movement. In this regard, Holocaust and Genocide 
Denial: A Contextual Perspective breaks new 
ground: exploring the background of revisionism, 
the specific methods devised by individual States to 
counter this phenomenon, and the rationale for their 
strategies. Bringing together authors whose 
expertise relates to the history of the Holocaust, 
genocide studies, international criminal law and 
social anthropology, the book offers insights into 
the history of revisionism and its varying contexts, 
but also provides a thought-provoking engagement 
with the challenging questions attached to its 
treatment in law and politics. 
 
Borch, F.L. (2017). Military trials of war 
criminals in the Netherlands East Indies 1946-
1949, Oxford University Press. 
 
From 1946 to 1949, the Dutch prosecuted more 
than 1000 Japanese soldiers and civilians for war 
crimes committed during the occupation of the 
Netherlands East Indies during World War II. They 
also prosecuted a small number of Dutch citizens 
for collaborating with their Japanese occupiers. The 
war crimes committed by the Japanese against 
military personnel and civilians in the East Indies 
were horrific, and included mass murder, murder, 
torture, mistreatment of prisoners of war, and 
enforced prostitution. Beginning in 1946, the Dutch 
convened military tribunals in various locations in 
the East Indies to hear the evidence of these 
atrocities and imposed sentences ranging from 
months and years to death; some 25 percent of 
those convicted were executed for their crimes. The 
difficulty arising out of gathering evidence and 
conducting the trials was exacerbated by the on-
going guerrilla war between Dutch authorities and 
Indonesian revolutionaries and in fact the trials 
ended abruptly in 1949 when 300 years of Dutch 
colonial rule ended and Indonesia gained its 
independence.  
 
Until the author began examining and analysing the 
records of trial from these cases, no English 
language scholar had published a comprehensive 
study of these war crimes trials. While the author 
looks at the war crimes prosecutions of the 
Japanese in detail this book also breaks new ground 
in exploring the prosecutions of Dutch citizens 
alleged to have collaborated with their Japanese 
occupiers. Anyone with a general interest in World 
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War II and the war in the Pacific, or a specific 
interest in war crimes and international law, will be 
interested in this book. 
 
Brandts, C. & S. Karstedt (eds.) (2017) 
Transitional Justice and the public sphere – 
Engagement, legitimicay and contestation, Hart 
Publishing. 
 
Transparency is a fundamental principle of justice. 
A cornerstone of the rule of law, it allows for public 
engagement and for democratic control of the 
decisions and actions of both the judiciary and the 
justice authorities. This book looks at the question 
of transparency within the framework of 
transitional justice. Bringing together scholars from 
across the disciplinary spectrum, the collection 
analyses the issue from socio-legal, cultural studies 
and practitioner perspectives. Taking a three-part 
approach, it firstly discusses basic principles 
guiding justice globally before exploring courts and 
how they make justice visible. Finally, the 
collection reviews the interface between law, 
transitional justice institutions and the public 
sphere. 
 
Brouwer, AM & AL Smeulers (Eds.) (2016). The 
Elgar Companion to the ICTR, Elgar. 
 
The Elgar Companion to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda is a one-stop reference 
resource on this complex tribunal, established in the 
aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which 
closed its doors on 31 December 2015. This 
Companion provides an insightful account of the 
workings and legacy of the ICTR in the field of 
international criminal justice. 
 
Surveying and analysing the contributions from 
different disciplinary angles, the Companion is 
comprised of four comprehensive parts. It begins 
with a detailed account of the establishment of the 
ICTR, covering the setting up of the tribunal, its 
mandate, structure and personnel. The second part 
explores substantive law and examines issues such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
sexual violence and modes of liability. The third 
part discusses procedural law and explores 
investigation, arrest, trial/appeal, evidence, rights of 
the accused, rights of victims and sentencing. It 
concludes with the fourth part, which considers the 
contribution of the ICTR to international criminal 
justice, as well as to the lives of Rwandans. 
 
An important contribution to the jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts, the Companion will 
appeal to academics, students and legal 
practitioners alike. It will be fascinating reading for 
anyone interested in international criminal law or 
the recent history of Rwanda. 
Clarke, P., Knottnerus A., E. de Volder (eds.) 
(2017) Africa and the ICC, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice 
comprises contributions from prominent scholars of 
different disciplines including international law, 
political science, cultural anthropology, African 
history and media studies. This unique collection 
provides the reader with detailed insights into the 
interaction between the African Union and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), but also looks 
further at the impact of the ICC at a societal level in 
African states and examines other justice 
mechanisms on a local and regional level in these 
countries. This investigation of the ICC's 
complicated relationship with Africa allows the 
reader to see that perceptions of justice are 
multilayered. 
 
Fishman, B. (2016) The master plan – ISIS, Al 
qaeda and the Jihadi strategy for final victory, 
Yale University Press. 
 
Given how quickly its operations have achieved 
global impact, it may seem that the Islamic State 
materialized suddenly. In fact, al-Qaeda’s 
operations chief, Sayf al-Adl, devised a seven-stage 
plan for jihadis to conquer the world by 2020 that 
included reestablishing the Caliphate in Syria 
between 2013 and 2016. Despite a massive schism 
between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, al-Adl’s 
plan has proved remarkably prescient. In summer 
2014, ISIS declared itself the Caliphate after 
capturing Mosul, Iraq—part of stage five in al-
Adl’s plan. Drawing on large troves of recently 
declassified documents captured from the Islamic 
State and its predecessors, counterterrorism expert 
Brian Fishman tells the story of this organization’s 
complex and largely hidden past—and what the 
master plan suggests about its future. Only by 
understanding the Islamic State’s full history—and 
the strategy that drove it—can we understand the 
contradictions that may ultimately tear it apart.  
 
Fortin, K. (2017) The accountability of armed 
groups under human rights law, Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Today the majority of the armed conflicts around 
the world are fought between States and armed 
groups, rather than between States. This changed 
conflict landscape creates an imperative to clarify 
the obligations of armed groups under international 
law. While it is generally accepted that armed 
groups are bound by international humanitarian 
law, the question of whether they are also bound by 
human rights law is controversial. This book brings 
significant new understanding to the question of 
whether and when armed groups might be bound by 
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human rights law. Its conclusions will benefit 
international law academics, legal practitioners, and 
political scientists and anthropologists working on 
issues related to rebel governance and civil wars. 
 
Hayashi, N. & C.M. Bailliet (eds.) (2017), The 
legitimacy of international criminal tribunals, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
With the ad hoc tribunals completing their 
mandates and the International Criminal Court 
under significant pressure, today's international 
criminal jurisdictions are at a critical juncture. Their 
legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. This 
multidisciplinary volume investigates key issues 
pertaining to legitimacy: criminal accountability, 
normative development, truth-discovery, 
complementarity, regionalism, and judicial 
cooperation. The volume sheds new light on 
previously unexplored areas, including the 
significance of redacted judgements, prosecutors' 
opening statements, rehabilitative processes of 
international convicts, victim expectations, court 
financing, and NGO activism. The book's original 
contributions will appeal to researchers, 
practitioners, advocates, and students of 
international criminal justice, accountability for war 
crimes and the rule of law. 
 
Ingelaere, B. (2016) Inside Rwanda’s Gaca 
courts – seeking justice after genocide, 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, victims, 
perpetrators, and the country as a whole struggled 
to deal with the legacy of the mass violence. The 
government responded by creating a new version of 
a traditional grassroots justice system called gacaca. 
Bert Ingelaere, based on his observation of two 
thousand gacaca trials, offers a comprehensive 
assessment of what these courts set out to do, how 
they worked, what they achieved, what they did not 
achieve, and how they affected Rwandan society. 
 
Weaving together vivid firsthand recollections, 
interviews, and trial testimony with systematic 
analysis, Ingelaere documents how the  gacaca  
shifted over time from confession to accusation, 
from restoration to retribution. He precisely 
articulates the importance of popular conceptions of 
what is true and just. Marked by methodological 
sophistication, extraordinary evidence, and deep 
knowledge of Rwanda, this is an authoritative, 
nuanced, and bittersweet account of one of the most 
important experiments in transitional justice after 
mass violence. 
 
LaFree, G. & J.D. Freilich (eds.) (2016) The 
handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, 
Wiley. 
The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism 
features a collection of essays that represent the 
most recent criminological research relating to the 
origins and evolution of, along with responses to, 
terrorism, from a criminological perspective. Offers 
an authoritative overview of the latest 
criminological research into the causes of and 
responses to terrorism in today’s world. Covers 
broad themes that include terrorism’s origins, 
theories, methodologies, types, relationship to other 
forms of crime, terrorism and the criminal justice 
system, ways to counter terrorism, and more. 
Features original contributions from a group of 
international experts in the field. Provides unique 
insights into the field through an exclusive focus on 
criminological conceptual frameworks and 
empirical studies that engage terrorism and 
responses to it 
 
Lewy, G. (2017) Perpetrators – the world of the 
Holocaust killers, Oxford University Press. 
 
The Nazis' attempt to annihilate the Jewish people, 
the Holocaust, continues to raise a disturbing 
question. About six million defenseless men, 
women, and children were murdered for no reason 
but their ancestry. Close to two million Jews were 
killed in mass shootings, while the remainder were 
asphyxiated or worked and starved to death. How 
could such terrible deeds happen in the heart of 
Christian Europe and among a nation known for its 
poets and thinkers, a people that had produced 
Schiller, Goethe, Bach, and Beethoven? What had 
converted so many seemingly ordinary people into 
killers, willing participants in what is probably the 
worst crime in modern history? That is the question 
Guenter Lewy seeks to answer in this book. 
Lewy provides a critical synthesis of recent 
literature on the perpetrators, broadening the 
discussion and developing a more complete and 
systematic answer to the question of why so many 
ordinary German people became mass murderers, 
drawing on previously untapped valuable sources, 
including officers' and soldiers' diaries; some 
35,000 letters written by soldiers serving in the 
East, many of which describe the murder of Jews; 
the recollections of Jewish survivors, and most 
importantly, the record of the trials of hundreds of 
Nazi perpetrators by German courts. The result is a 
wealth of information about the Holocaust in all its 
horrible particulars and about those who carried out 
those hideous deeds. The book systematically 
examines the role of individual pathology, of 
specifically German factors such as obedience to 
authority, and the impact of ideology on group 
behavior. The actual perpetrators, Lewy concludes, 
acted out of a variety of motives. Some were 
convinced haters of Jews, while others killed out of 
a sense of duty, to advance their career, because 
they followed orders, or because they wanted to 
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conform to the group. There was no uniform Nazi 
perpetrator type. 
 
Guenter Lewy grew up in Germany and lived some 
six years under Nazi rule. During the November 
1938 pogrom known as Kristallnacht, he was on the 
receiving end of storm-trooper brutality, and his 
father was taken to the Buchenwald concentration 
camp, barely surviving his three-month ordeal 
there. The question of "why they did it," therefore, 
is of far more than theoretical interest for the 
author-it is a passionate attempt to illuminate a 
dismal chapter of history that cannot be forgotten. 
 
 
Lynch, O. & J. Argomanitz, (2017). Victims and 
perpetrators of terrorism – exploring identities, 
roles and narratives, Routledge 
 
While the perpetrators of political violence have 
been the subject of significant academic research, 
victims of terrorism and political violence have 
rarely featured in this landscape. In an effort to 
capture the vast complexity of terrorism, and to 
widen the scope of the agenda that informs 
terrorism research, this book presents a series of 
analyses that examines the role of the perpetrators, 
the experience of the victims, the public and media 
perceptions of both, and given the inherent intricacy 
of the phenomenon, how we might think about 
engaging with perpetrators in an effort to prevent 
further violence. By considering the role of the 
many actors who are central to our understanding 
and framing of terrorism and political violence, this 
book highlights the need to focus on how the 
interactivity of individuals and contexts have 
implications for the emergence, maintenance and 
termination of campaigns of political violence. The 
volume aims to understand not only how former 
perpetrators and victims can work in preventing 
violence in a number of contexts but, more broadly, 
the narratives that support and oppose violence, the 
construction of victimisation, the politicisation of 
victimhood, the justifications for violence and the 
potential for preventing and encouraging desistance 
from violence. 
This book will be of much interest to students of 
terrorism and political violence, victimology, 
criminology, security studies and IR in general. 
 
Ohlin, J.D., L. May, Finkelstein (eds.) (2017) 
Weighing lives in war, Oxford University press 
 
The chief means to limit and calculate the costs of 
war are the philosophical and legal concepts of 
proportionality and necessity. Both categories are 
meant to restrain the most horrific potential of war. 
The volume explores the moral and legal issues in 
the modern law of war in three major categories. In 
so doing, the contributions will look for new and 
innovative approaches to understanding the process 
of weighing lives implicit in all theories of jus in 
bello: who counts in war, understanding 
proportionality, and weighing lives in asymmetric 
conflicts. These questions arise on multiple levels 
and require interdisciplinary consideration of both 
philosophical and legal themes. 
 
Plesch, D. (2017) Human Rights after Hitler – 
the lost history of prosecuting axis war crimes, 
George Town University Press. 
 
Human Rights after Hitler reveals thousands of 
forgotten US and Allied war crimes prosecutions 
against Hitler and other Axis war criminals based 
on a popular movement for justice that stretched 
from Poland to the Pacific. These cases provide a 
great foundation for twenty-first-century human 
rights and accompany the achievements of the 
Nuremberg trials and postwar conventions. They 
include indictments of perpetrators of the Holocaust 
made while the death camps were still operating, 
which confounds the conventional wisdom that 
there was no official Allied response to the 
Holocaust at the time. This history also brings long 
overdue credit to the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (UNWCC), which operated during and 
after World War II. 
 
Sands, Ph (2017) East West Street, Weidenfeld 
Nicholson. 
 
A profound and profoundly important book – a 
moving personal detective story, uncovering of 
secret pasts, and a book that explores the creation 
and development of world-changing legal concepts 
that came about as a result of the unprecedented 
atrocities of Hitler’s Reich. East West Street looks 
at the personal and intellectual evolution of the two 
men who simultaneously originated the ideas of 
genocide and crimes against humanity both of 
whom, not knowing the other studied at the same 
university with the same professors, in a city little 
known today that was a major cultural centre of 
Europe, “the little Paris of Ukraine”, a city 
variously called Lemberg, Lwow. Lvov or Lviv. It 
is also a spellbinding family memoir, as the author 
traces the mysterious story of his grandfather, as he 
manoeuvred through Europe in the face of Nazi 
atrocities. 
 
Sjoberg, L. (2016). Women as war time rapist – 
beyond sensation and stereotyping, NYU Press 
 
Very few women are wartime rapists. Very few 
women issue commands to commit sexual violence. 
Very few women play a role in making war plans 
that feature the intentional sexual violation of other 
women. This book is about those very few 
women. Women as Wartime Rapists reveals the 
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stories of female perpetrators of sexual violence and 
their place in wartime conflict, legal policy, and the 
punishment of sexual violence. More broadly, 
Laura Sjoberg asks, what do the actions and 
perceptions of female perpetrators of sexual 
violence reveal about our broader conceptions of 
war, violence, sexual assault, and gender? 
 
This book explores specific historical case studies, 
such as Nazi Germany, Serbia, the contemporary 
case of ISIS, and others, to understand how and 
why women participate in rape during war and 
conflict. Sjoberg examines the contrast between the 
visibility of female victims and the invisibility of 
female perpetrators, as well as the distinction 
between rape and genocidal rape, which is used as a 
weapon against a particular ethnic or national 
group. Further, she explores women’s engagement 
with genocidal rape and how some orchestrated the 
ethnic cleansing of entire regions. A provocative 
approach to a sensationalized topic, Women as 
Wartime Rapists offers important insights into not 
only the topic of female perpetrators of wartime 
sexual violence, but to larger notions of gender and 
violence with crucial cultural, legal, and political 
implications. 
 
Steer, C. (2017). Translating guilt – identifying 
leadership liability for mass atrocity crimes, 
T.M.C Asser Press. 
 
This book seeks to understand how and why we 
should hold leaders responsible for the collective 
mass atrocities that are committed in times of 
conflict. It attempts to untangle the debates on 
modes of liability in international criminal law 
(ICL) that have become truly complex over the last 
twenty years, and to provide a way to identify the 
most appropriate model for leadership liability. A 
unique comparative theory of ICL is offered, which 
clarifies the way in which ICL develops as a 
patchwork of different domestic criminal law 
notions. This theory forms the basis for the 
comparison of some influential domestic criminal 
law systems, with a view to understanding the 
policy and cultural reasons for their 
differences. There is a particular focus on the 
background of the German law which has 
influenced the International Criminal Court so 
much recently. This helps to understand, and seek a 
solution to, the current impasses in the debates on 
which model of liability should be applied.  
An entire chapter of the book is devoted to 
considering why leaders should be held responsible 
for crimes committed by their subordinates, from 
legal, moral and pragmatic perspectives. The moral 
responsibility of leaders is translated into criminal 
liability, and the different domestic models of 
liability are translated to the international context, 
in such a way as to appeal to advanced students of 
ICL, academics, and practitioners who want to 
understand the complexities of leadership liability 
in international criminal law today and identify the 
best way to approach it. 
 
Viola, L. (2018) Stalinist Perpetrators on trial, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Between the summer of 1937 and November 1938, 
the Stalinist regime arrested over 1.5 million people 
for "counterrevolutionary" and "anti-Soviet" 
activity and either summarily executed or exiled 
them to the Gulag. While we now know a great deal 
about the experience of victims of the Great Terror, 
we know almost nothing about the lower- and 
middle-level Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh 
Del (NKVD), or secret police, cadres who carried 
out Stalin's murderous policies. Unlike the postwar, 
public trials of Nazi war criminals, NKVD 
operatives were tried secretly. And what exactly 
happened in those courtrooms was unknown until 
now.  
 
In what has been dubbed "the purge of the purgers," 
almost one thousand NKVD officers were 
prosecuted by Soviet military courts. Scapegoated 
for violating Soviet law, they were charged with 
multiple counts of fabrication of evidence, 
falsification of interrogation protocols, use of 
torture to secure "confessions," and murder during 
pre-trial detention of "suspects" - and many were 
sentenced to execution themselves. The 
documentation generated by these trials, including 
verbatim interrogation records and written 
confessions signed by perpetrators; testimony by 
victims, witnesses, and experts; and transcripts of 
court sessions, provides a glimpse behind the 
curtains of the terror. It depicts how the terror was 
implemented, what happened, and who was 
responsible, demonstrating that orders from above 
worked in conjunction with a series of situational 
factors to shape the contours of state violence.  
 
Based on chilling and revelatory new archival 
documents from the Ukrainian secret police 
archives, Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial illuminates 
the darkest recesses of Soviet repression — the 
interrogation room, the prison cell, and the place of 
execution — and sheds new light on those who 
carried out the Great Terror. 
 
Weerdestijn, M. (2016). The rationality of  
dictators – towards a more effective 
implementation of the responsibility to protect, 
Intersentia. 
 
A non-democratic system of government is an 
important risk factor for the perpetration of atrocity 
crimes, meaning genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. At the 
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2005 World Summit the international community 
accepted the responsibility to protect populations 
from these crimes when the domestic state is failing 
to do so. The implementation of the responsibility 
to protect, however, leaves much to be desired. This 
book studies the role dictators play in orchestrating 
mass atrocities and analyses their decision-making 
process when the international community tries to 
stop or mitigate the perpetration of these crimes. 
Through a comparative case study of Pol Pot and 
Slobodan Milosevic it argues that the role ideology 
plays in the decision-making process of the dictator 
is an important determinant of their responsiveness. 
In doing so, it challenges the common notion that 
all dictators are primarily motivated by retaining 
their position of power and argues that while 
dictators are frequently characterised as raging mad 
men, this is not necessarily always the case. It 
rather argues in favour of a more nuanced approach 
to rationality, that uses the work of Max Weber to 
acknowledge that different types of rationality exist, 
when analysing the decision-making process of 
dictators. The book is therefore an indispensable 
resource for scholars who are interested in the role 
of dictators in bringing forth and stopping mass 
atrocities and for anyone who wants more insight 
into the rationality of dictators. 
 
Weisband, E. (2017) The macabresque – human 
violation and hate in genocide, mass atrocity and 
enemy-making, Oxford University Press. 
 
Studies of genocide and mass atrocity most often 
focus on their causes and consequences, their aims 
and effects, and the number of people killed. But 
the question remains, if the main goal is death, then 
why is torture necessary? This book argues that 
genocide and mass atrocity are committed not as an 
end in themselves but as a means to pursue 
sustained and systemic torture — the spectacle of 
violence — against its victims. Extermination is not 
the only, or even the primary, goal of genocidal 
campaigns.  
 
In The Macabresque, Edward Weisband looks at 
different episodes of mass violence (Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, the Holocaust, post-Ottoman 
Turkey, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, among 
other instances) to consider why different methods 
of violence were used in each and how they related 
to the particular cultural milieu in which they were 
perpetrated. He asserts that it is not accidental that 
certain images capture our memory as emblematic 
of specific genocides or mass atrocities (the death 
marches of the Armenian genocide, mass starvation 
in the Ukraine, the killing apparatus and 
laboratories of the Holocaust, the killing fields of 
Cambodia) because such violence assumes a kind 
of style each time and place it arises. Weisband 
looks at these variations in terms of their aesthetic 
or dramaturgical style, or what he calls the 
macabresque. The macabresque is ever present in 
genocide and mass atrocity across time, place and 
episode. Beyond the horrors of lethality, it is the 
defining feature of concentration and/or death 
camps, detention centers, prisons, ghettos, killing 
fields, and the houses, schools and hospitals 
converted into hubs for torture. Macabresque 
dramaturgy also assumes many aesthetic forms, all 
designed to inflict hideous pain and humiliating 
punishments, sometimes in controlled 
environments, but also during frenzied moments of 
staged public horror. These kinds of performative 
violations permit perpetrators to revel in their 
absolute power but simultaneously to project 
hatred, revenge and revulsion onto victims, who 
embody the shame, humiliation and loss felt by 
their torturers. By understanding how and why 
mass violence occurs and the reasons for its 
variations, The Macabresque aims to explain why 
so many seemingly normal or "ordinary" people 
participate in mass atrocity across cultures and why 





PhD-Defence – Carola Lingaas, 
University of Oslo - ‘Race’: Relic or 
Useful Concept? 
 
The annihilation of Jews during the Holocaust, the 
brutal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, the 
genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, – and more 
recently the persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar – 
are just a few examples of serious crimes that 
deeply shock the international community. These 
horrible events are often accompanied by the pledge 
“Never Again!” Sadly, however, atrocities happen 
time and again. 
 
International criminal law defines who is protected 
from such crimes and, conversely, who can be 
punished for committing them. Members of racial 
groups are protected under international law against 
genocide, persecution, and apartheid. But what is 
race? In 2017, is it legitimate to talk about race – or 
is race perhaps better stowed away as a relic? And 
why was this contentious term not even discussed 
when the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was drafted?  
 
The Nazis defined the Jews as a race inferior to the 
Aryan race, the Khmer Rouge identified the ‘new 
people’ as enemies with a biologically dissimilar 
essence, and in Darfur (Sudan), the Janjaweed 
militia labelled their enemies derogatorily as 
‘Zourga’, or black Africans. Although natural 
sciences have long determined that humankind 
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cannot be meaningfully divided into biologically 
different races, the social significance of race 
remains high. Rather than attempting to objectively 
construct distinct racial groups, Carola Lingaas’ 
PhD dissertation on “The Concept of Race in 
International Criminal Law” suggests that judges in 
international criminal trials should consider 
perpetrators’ inner thoughts. Their mind-sets will 
determine the protected racial group. 
 
The Akayesu trial judgment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was the first 
ever conviction for the crime of genocide following 
a trial by an international criminal tribunal. This 
judgment is the cornerstone of the legal definition 
of the protected groups of genocide, including the 
racial group. Carola Lingaas’ dissertation follows 
the development of the jurisprudence on the 
protected groups of genocide from Akayesu until 
more recent decisions by the ICC and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC). 
 
“The conventional definition of racial group,” 
Akayesu held, “is based on the hereditary physical 
traits often identified with a geographical region, 
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or 
religious factors”.42 The ICTR Trial Chamber did 
not provide any supporting evidence, legal or extra-
legal, to substantiate this definition. The reference 
to ‘hereditary physical traits’ implies an objective 
approach to a scientifically highly disputed method, 
namely the identification of people by means of 
their physical appearance, such as their skin color. 
According to an English dictionary, hereditary 
signifies “genetically transmitted or transmittable 
from parent to offspring.”43 Defining race as the 
genetic transmission of physical traits is not only 
scientifically wrong, it also preserves outdated and 
contentious methods of classifying people.  
 
Lingaas’ research shows that while the judgments 
of the different international criminal courts have 
gradually moved away from the objective definition 
of the Akayesu trial judgment, they have never fully 
endorsed a subjective, perpetrator-based approach 
to defining the protected groups of genocide. She 
argues that an evolutive interpretation of the term 
‘race’ for international criminal law coheres in its 
result with the recognition of the inherent 
subjectivity of a (pre-) genocidal process.  
 
                                                                
42 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-




29 November 2017). 
While social sciences have long recognized the 
importance of this process, in which a group of 
‘others’ is identified, stigmatized, discriminated, 
and finally dehumanized, it is rarely discussed in 
judgments or legal scholarship. Prior to any 
genocide ˗ the ultimate hate crime ˗ commonalities 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are removed. Instead, 
dissimilarities are enhanced, often by means of 
communication such as propaganda, to the point 
where the perpetrator calls for the extermination of 
the ‘others’.  
 
Besides the strong legal component, Carola 
Lingaas’ dissertation incorporates in its analysis 
social scientific research, according to which most 
cases of mass violence are preceded by so-called 
‘othering’. In this process, the victim group is 
presented as innately and therefore immutably 
different, inferior, and at the same time a threat. In 
the eyes of the perpetrator, the members of the 
victim group consist of an inherently different 
essence that threatens the survival of the 
perpetrator’s own (real or imagined) group. Threat 
is a key element that is present in all cases of 
genocide. In the process of othering, a dichotomy 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is created. It forms an 
abyss, where there is no middle-ground and where 
individuals are forced to take side. The 
marginalized ‘other’ group can, notably, be an 
imagined identity, entirely dependent on the 
perpetrator’s perceptions. 
 
This dynamic of setting apart a group defined as 
different is particularly true for the crime of 
genocide, but elements of othering are equally 
present in the crimes of apartheid and persecution 
that also protect members of, among other, racial 
groups. As such, the interpretation of ‘racial group’ 
(for the crimes of genocide and apartheid) and 
‘racial grounds’ (for the crime of persecution) 
should always be subjectively defined from the 
view of the perpetrator. 
 
In its conclusion, Carola Lingaas’ study suggests 
that race in international criminal law should be 
constructed based upon the perpetrator’s mind. The 
perpetrator’s (objectively) observable demeaning 
and dehumanizing behavior reveals his 
understanding of the victims. As such, ‘race’ 
becomes a matter of proof: if the perpetrator 
perceives his victims as members of a different 
(and, typically, an inferior) racial group and 
manifests this understanding through his behavior, 
he can be found guilty for committing an 






December 2017 page 22 
CONFERENCES 
 
EXPERT MEETING: Punishing International 
Crimes in Domestic Courts: Sentencing, 
Incarceration and Reintegration 
 
By: Adina-Loredana Nistor 
      
 
     “Time 
is the longest distance between two places.” -
     
  Tennessee Williams, The Glass 
Menagerie 
 
They say time heals all wounds. That the pain 
diminishes, that the sorrow quietens. But can such a 
statement hold true when the wounds inflicted bear 
the memory of extraordinary violence, committed 
in extraordinary circumstances, during vicious 
conflicts that have over and over again shocked the 
world? Until a few decades ago, victims of mass 
atrocities were regarded as collateral damage in 
what were deemed to be necessary battles, thrives 
for independence and power, struggles between 
various groups of people, all wanting to gain a 
significant spot on the world map. However, the 
way in which the world had been responding to 
armed conflict and often unnecessary violence 
inflicted on civilians was about to change. And this 
change would bring new approaches to how 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations were 
about to be held responsible and how the 
punishment received would fit the crimes. 
 
On the 12th of June 2017, professionals trained in 
(international) criminal law attended the Expert 
Meeting “Punishing International Crimes in 
Domestic Courts: Sentencing, Incarceration and 
Reintegration” organized in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, by the Centre for International 
Criminal Justice (CICJ), VU University 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands Institute for the Study 
of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR) and 
supported by a VENI research grant from the Dutch 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), by the 
NSCR and the A-lab. Through four moderated 
panels, the experts from around the world addressed 
(i) theoretical considerations on the issue; and the 
situation of domestic sentencing practices for 
international crimes in countries from (ii) former 
Yugoslavia, (iii) Latin America and (iv) Africa & 
Europe. The meeting, presided by Barbora Hola and 
Joris van Wijk from VU Amsterdam, opened with 
an introductory overview of the topic and on the 
historical considerations that need to be taken into 
account when discussing the present time reality of 
international criminal law.  
 
It was only in the aftermath of WWII that a 
consensus was reached and when international legal 
recognition that crimes could invoke individual 
responsibility was achieved. This precedent created 
a split between two worlds: a world before the term 
genocide was coined, and the new world which 
now had a name for the unconceivable intentional 
destruction of people. Numerous international trials 
have taken place since the Nuremberg judgements 
were delivered. Prosecutions at domestic courts are 
also increasingly taking place and those responsible 
for monstrous crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide are being punished. In the realm of 
ordinary, domestic crimes, imprisonment is a 
common form of punishment for violent offences in 
numerous countries. A similar approach has been 
adopted at the international level where 
international crimes have been prosecuted. 
However, despite the creation of various courts and 
tribunals and of the permanent International 
Criminal Court (the ICC), the numerous 
(imprisonment) sentences that have been passed 
and the fact that many international prisoners have 
served their time and have even returned to their 
home countries, an international penology (or 
practice) to offer guidance on how to address 
international perpetrators in terms of rehabilitation 
or integration is still lacking behind. Nevertheless, 
the enforcement of these international punishments 
continues to take place at the domestic level, in the 
prisons of a small number of States, which agreed 
to accept international prisoners.  
 
International standards, impoverished domestic 
prisons: “the prisoners eat better than the staff” 
A few of the panellists discussed the issue of 
international versus national standards. When 
envisioning a harmonization of the two, one cannot 
help but notice the dichotomy this process entails. 
Certain African countries regard the international 
criminal system, which for many is embodied in the 
ICC, as a force that separates the two (Africa and 
the ICC), while it seeks to have them collaborate. 
One of the speakers at the meeting underlined that 
the problem may not be one of a clash between 
domestic and international standards, since most 
African countries adhered to regional or 
international standards, but that is rather a matter of 
(insufficient to non-existing) resources. It is not for 
a lack of willingness that certain countries find it 
challenging to offer conditions of imprisonment 
that do not infringe upon the rights of the 
imprisoned, but rather the financial burden of 
achieving such conditions. In many national 
prisons, issues such as over-crowding and overall 
extremely poor conditions become even more 
controversial when the same buildings have 
separate wing for international prisoners, which are 
often created with the assistance of the international 
community. These wings adhere to higher 
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international standards, and their prisoners benefit 
of better overall conditions compared to other, 
domestic prisoners. To quote one panellist, they 
“eat better than the staff” that work in these 
institutions. Ultimately, as the international 
standards are indeed an ideal that cannot be reached 
by all, they nevertheless serve as a model. Nations 
should always strive to reach this ideal, and not take 
steps back or lower the bar. On the other hand, if 
prison conditions of those considered “the most 
responsible” tried by the international courts are so 
much better compared to many of their followers 
tried and incarcerated by domestic courts, in 
ordinary existing prison, one might wonder what 
message such system sends. 
 
Between then and now, between atrocities and 
trials 
All presentations discussed different 
implementations of international standards into 
various national systems, and how the two merged 
and created new hybrids. Judges working in 
international courts and tribunals also bring with 
them experiences gained while working in domestic 
courts, thus shaping the way in which international 
criminal law is applied throughout proceedings and 
sentencing. The speakers also discussed how 
societal needs differ from the end of a conflict, 
when a retributive approach is often sought, to the 
moment the conflict and the crimes start to become 
history and other societal needs of often take over. 
As atrocities slowly become distant memories, 
societies transform, the laws change and the passing 
of time becomes a mitigating factor for those who 
stand trial for past crimes. Those responsible of 
heinous offences have often times been relieved 
from their sentences as a result of blanket pardons 
issued by certain governments, or their time in 
prison has been significantly reduced based on the 
perpetrators’ ‘good behaviour’ while incarcerated. 
The common thread between national and 
international ways of addressing international 
crimes remains a lengthy distance in time - and 
sometimes also in space - from the commission of 
atrocities. The international courts that have been 
put in place are oftentimes far away from the 
societies that they aim to address and even 
reconcile, they are seen as isolated and retributive 
systems. More often than not an imprisonment 
sentence rendered in an international court do not 
meet the victims’ expectations of justice. 
Oftentimes, those who put their hope in these 
tribunals to offer a punishment that would fit the 
extent of the atrocity committed are disappointed 
by the results. Other forms of punishment may 
indeed be more appropriate depending on the 
specific background of the conflict. And in this 
regard, it is the domestic systems where diversity 
can be found. Rwanda’s system of community 
justice known as gacaca courts for example, has 
also the role to advance reconciliation to affected 
communities. Trials offer victims the possibility to 
learn the truth about the death of their loved ones. 
And perpetrators the opportunity to confess, show 
remorse for their crimes and ask for. Also, the 
punishments rendered in such trials include but are 
not limited to imprisonment and some offenders 
pay for their offences through community work. 
Similarly, the peace agreement that the government 
of Colombia signed with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, or FARC, stipulates that 
FARC members who committed or ordered crimes 
but confess to them have the option of working 
“community service” projects and acts of reparation 
instead of being imprisoned. One year after the 
peace agreement has been signed, the agreement is 
fragile and it is unclear whether it will last. But the 
mechanism is in place. At the international courts 
and tribunals, which serve the role of punishing 
those most responsible, or the masterminds behind 
the large scale and systematic crimes, the only type 
of punishment rendered is imprisonment. The 
international approach lacks alternatives, but it also 
lacks the resources to implement different 
sanctions. At the same time, it is perhaps not even 
desirable to expect that the national and the 
international systems “behave” in the same way.  
 
As one speaker noted, to compare (thousands of) 
trial cases that have been taking place in the 
domestic courts, to the few, yet prominent cases at 
international courts and tribunals, while feasible to 
certain extent, it becomes extremely complex when 
looking at the contexts in which both justice 
mechanisms operate. Domestic courts frequently 
need to address and factor in many different, often 
conflicting political, societal and pragmatic needs. 
The international criminal courts, on the other hand, 
have often times been criticized for operating in a 
relative vacuum, for being distant from where the 
conflicts took place and the societies that 
ultimately, they seek to deliver justice to. 
 
As more and more time passes since the 
commission of crimes, the bigger the distance 
between the two places: where it happened and 
where it was prosecuted. Even if geographically the 
space is the same, the social background and the 
shape justice takes is nevertheless different.  
 
CONFERENCE IAGS: International 
Association of Genocide Scholars 
Conference 2017 – Australia 
By: Melanie O’Brien 
 
In July 2017, the International Association of 
Genocide Scholars (IAGS) Conference was held at 
the University of Queensland in Brisbane, 
Australia; the first time an IAGS conference has 
been held in the Asia-Pacific region. Co-hosted by 
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the TC Beirne School of Law and the Asia-Pacific 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APR2P), 
and co-convened by Dr Melanie O’Brien and Dr 
Annie Pohlman, the conference theme was Justice 
and the Prevention of Genocide.  
 
With 200 attendees from 29 countries, the 
conference promoted the global concern of growing 
crises of mass violence around the world, and 
discussion on means and methods to reduce mass 
violence. Papers addressed justice and prevention 
issues relating to past and present situations, from 
Australian colonial genocide to the Holocaust, 
Rwanda, Indonesia, Japan, Armenia, Iraq and the 
Rohingya. Other presentations focused on thematic 
areas such as art, culture, film studies, memory, 
transitional justice, trauma and education, and how 
these fields in particular can contribute to genocide 
prevention and justice for mass atrocities.  
 
Keynotes showcased international and 
predominantly Australian expertise in the field of 
atrocity studies, delivered by local indigenous elder 
Dr Lilla Watson; R2P expert Professor Alex 
Bellamy; head of the ICC’s Gender and Children’s 
Unit, Gloria Atiba Davies; Deputy International 
Co-Prosecutor of the ECCC, William Smith AO; 
Asian war crimes historian Professor Robert Cribb; 
and scholar of colonial atrocities against indigenous 
Australians, Professor Lyndall Ryan. 
 
While much of the conference was focused on 
academic presentations, there were also other 
events, including Culture Under Attack, a 
photographic exhibition hosted by the Australian 
Red Cross and the APR2P; and a screening of the 
film Denial which included a panel discussion on 
the film and its issues with Dr Kirril Shields, 
Professor Henry Theriault and Dr Ted Nannicelli. 
After the conference, some attendees went on an 
excursion to the Gold Coast, where they learnt 
about Australian Aboriginal culture, and were able 
to see and pat native animals. 
 
Genocide scholars carry out crucial work on 
understanding genocide and other mass atrocities. 
Being a multi-disciplinary organisation, IAGS 
enables scholars to learn about developments in 
diverse fields of study, which serves only to enrich 
understanding and analysis of mass atrocities and 
thus how we can prevent and punish them. 
 
IAGS2017 was made possible with the generous 









IMPACT: Center against Human 
Trafficking and Sexual Violence in 
Conflict 
 
By: Eefje de Volder and Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer 
 
Early 2017, we started our own organisation: 
IMPACT: Center against Human Trafficking and 
Sexual Violence in Conflict.  
 
Human trafficking and conflict-related sexual 
violence are not ‘easy going’ subjects. Why decide 
to specialise in these phenomena? Whether it is for 
profit, power or for demoralising purposes, in both 
of these crimes human beings are the targets. 
Vulnerable people – men, women and children – 
fall victim of the cruel intentions of others. We 
have taken this intrinsic injustice of being targeted 
for the simple reason of being in a more susceptible 
position than others at heart and it has motivated us 
to contribute to addressing and combatting these 
crimes and to support and give voice to those who 
are unable to fight against this injustice alone. 
 
Since a few years we have been contemplating 
setting up a centre of expertise. Even though we 
both were already doing research, giving advice, 
offering training and education, and implementing 
empowerment projects in our particular field of 
expertise, we felt that we could accomplish even 
more when we would join forces. 
 
While human trafficking and conflict-related sexual 
violence may, at first glance, appear to be very 
distinct wrongdoings, in practice the underlying 
issues are the same, particularly when focussing on 
human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The 
forms of sexual violence that may come into play, 
the stigma that is still persistent in relation to 
female perpetrators and male victims, the 
difficulties children face that are born as a result of 
the crimes are just a few of the cross-cutting issues 
that both phenomena share. 
 
By combining the knowledge of two distinct fields, 
we believe to be able to contribute in a distinct way 
to the quest to combat both crimes and to offer 
justice to victims. We do this through research and 
advise, education and awareness, training and 
capacity building, and empowerment project and 
advocacy. This year we started, for instance, with a 
Summer School on conflict-related sexual violence 
and human trafficking, provided training to 
Ugandan law officials on the prosecution of 
conflict-related sexual violence, and conducted 
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research on human trafficking, in particular forced 
labour.  
 
Interested in learning more about our activities or to 
connect, please contact us via e-mail (info@impact-
now.org), visit our website (www.impact-now.org) 
or follow us on social media @impctnow 
(Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram).  
 
European Criminology Group on 
Atrocity Crimes and Transitional 
Justice (ECACTJ) 
 
The European Criminology Group on Atrocity 
Crimes and Transitional Justice (ECACTJ) 
provides a network for European criminologists 
who are engaged in research on atrocity crimes and 
transitional justice, whether in or on Europe, or 
globally. The aim of this Working Group is to 
enhance the contribution of criminology and 
criminologists in this field, to stimulate research in 
and on Europe and to promote exchange between 
European and international researchers. The group 
collaborates with other networks and research 
groups in the field. The Supranational Criminology 
Network is represented in the group by its founder, 
Professor Alette Smeulers, University of 
Groningen, Netherlands. With its focus on 
researchers in Europe, it is nonetheless global in its 
perspectives. The group was founded in 2013, and 
has thrived since then with an increasing 
membership. To become a member please contact: 
n.knust@mpicc.de  
 
Website: https://ecactj.org/  
 
PRIZE: Stephan Parmentier, KU 
Leuven 
 
Stephan Parmentier was awarded with an important 
prize by the Victimology Society of Serbia in 
November 2017. He won the ‘Award for 
contribution to the development of non-conflict and 
comprehensive approach to dealing with the war 
and ward crimes "Third way"". We wish to 
congratulate Stephan Parmentier with this well-





The website supranationalcriminology.org is 
currently off-line as it will be moved to a new 






The newsletter will be sent electronically to all who 
have signed up on the website. Scholars who 
conduct research in the field of international crimes, 
such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and other gross human rights violations, 
international (criminal) law or any other relevant 
subject matter are invited to send us their details 
and they will be enlisted on the website. In case you 
are interested: please contact us: 
a.l.smeulers@rug.nl and give your names, position, 
institutional affiliation, e-mail address, research 
interest and website and we will enlist you as a 
scholar within two weeks. 
 
Others interested in receiving the newsletter who do 
not conduct research in any of the related areas can 
subscribe to the newsletter as an affiliated member. 
Please inform us of your interest via a mail to: 
a.l.smeulers@rug.nl and supply us with your name 
and e-mail address and you will receive the 








Roelof Haveman, roelof.haveman@gmail.com 
 
Barbora Holà, NSCR and VU University, 
Amsterdam,  b.hola@vu.nl 
 
Thijs Bouwknegt, Researcher NIOD  and 
Journalist, Thijs.Bouwknegt@gmail.com 
 
James Nyawo, School of Security, Diplomacy and 
Peace Studies, Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya  
nyawo.james@ku.ac.ke 
 
Suzanne Schot, PhD student University of 
Groningen, s.l.schot@rug.nl   
Book editor  
 
Please send submissions for the newsletter to: 
a.l.smeulers@rug.nl  
 
Deadline next issue: 1st of April 2018 
